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Families and Transitions in Germany

National Report for the Project 'Families and Transitions in Europe' for Germany

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1. Introduction

This report documents the situation of young people's transitions from school to work with a specific focus on the support they receive either from their families or the welfare state. It also questions the possibilities of families to support their offspring. The report covers the whole of Germany while specific sections refer to the differences between East and West as well as to the specific situation of migrant youth and families. These particular perspectives reflect social inequalities between Eastern and Western, German and Non-German youth as well as cultural aspects related to the transformation of post-socialist societies on the one hand and to contexts of migration on the other hand. Due to the fact that youth research and family hardly relate to each other the report shifts between the youth and the family perspectives with some attempts of integration.

Chapter 2 is related to the system of school to work transitions. Institutions of education and training, labour market structures and policies for young unemployed are described and structural trends in youth transitions are analysed. In chapter 3 the relation between the support systems of family and welfare state is described. First, the main policies and institutions of family and welfare policies are explained. Subsequently, structural trends in young people's relations to their families are analysed. In subsections differentiated perspectives on Eastern Germany and on the situation of migrants respectively ethnic minorities are developed. Section 4 deals with the subjective views of both young people and their parents. Again, differentiation between East and West and according to migrants/ethnic minorities are made. In section 5 it is documented how these structures and trends are reflected in recent theoretical discourses.

2. The System of School to Work Transitions in Germany

2.1 The Institutional Level

The Education System

The German transition system is based on a highly selective school system: after four years pupils are selected according to individual achievement in elementary education. They then follow one of three routes, each of which differs considerably with regard to social status and later training and employment prospects. The Basic Secondary School (Hauptschule) leads to the Certificate of Compulsory Education after five years (nine including primary school), the Middle Secondary School (Realschule) provides a certificate of a higher status after six years (ten in total). Only the Grammar School (Gymnasium) provides a qualification (Abitur) giving access to higher education after eight or years nine (depending on region and with regard to university or polytechnic; twelve or thirteen years in total). It is also important to note that education and training is organized regionally in Germany and that the rigidity of this selection process will therefore vary. On the one hand there is a difference between West Germany and East Germany where prior to unification the school system was structured around a comprehensive secondary education. In the process of re-structuring the school system after unification this was reflected by organizing Hauptschule in a less strictly closed way but integrating it with the Realschule. On the other hand, in regions characterized by a dominance of social-democratic governments comprehensive schools are more relevant.

Vocational Education and Training

The institutional structure of school to work transitions in Germany can be characterized by two thresholds: the 'first threshold' from school to vocational training, and the 'second threshold' from vocational training to employment. By this metaphor - which however reproduces the ideology of linear normal biographies and neglects the socio-economic and socio-cultural processes of de-standardisation of transitions - the major role of vocational training in regulating youth transitions becomes evident (Pohl, Schneider, 2000). Whilst higher education is restricted to those holding the 'Abitur' approximately two thirds of all school leavers enter the *dual system* of apprenticeship training: a three and half year company-based practical training combined with general and vocational education in professional schools. Apprenticeship contracts are made between young people and

companies thus giving them access to the social insurance system and assuring an apprenticeship wage (see section 3.1). However, since the late 1980s there has been a heavy decline in the supply of apprenticeship places (see section 2.2). First, companies withdraw from the dual system to reduce labour costs and to be more flexible. Second, the dual system traditionally was related to the manufacturing and crafts sector while adequate training in the service sector has not been developed sufficiently. And third, due to the re-structuring of the economy after the re-unification in Eastern Germany the structural basis of the dual system - companies supplying apprenticeship places - are lacking to a large extent (cf. Baethge, 2000). *Vocational counselling* provided by the national employment service has a key role in linking school and training. It is responsible for orientation in the last two years of school, information in specific documentation centres, counselling, and the placement of applicants in apprenticeship places. Vocational counsellors are under considerable pressure to channel applicants to the available apprenticeship places. Thus, the space for individual aspirations and ambitions is very much limited by institutional prerogatives. Young people, as well as youth workers and social workers therefore often criticise the vocational counselling for failing to respect individual needs and for the limited time available for individual counselling (see Behrens and Brown 1994; Nuglisch and Pfendner, 1998).

Programmes for unemployed young people

The decline of training opportunities has raised the attention for programmes and measures for unemployed young people constantly in the 1990ies. In this respect however institutions distinguish between applicants who have not 'been placed' in vocational training and young people registered unemployed. This reflects the institutional efforts to prevent that young people register as unemployed through a variety of pre-vocational measures. There is at first the *pre-vocational year* in a professional school which is compulsory for school leavers under 18 that are not in regular training (BVJ). The aim is to make students - who come from a diversity of (often migrant) backgrounds and tend to have limited (German) language skills, and very low or no qualifications - more 'trainable' whilst additional qualifications are not provided. Beside the school-based pre-vocational year there is variety of measures and schemes for young people who have not yet entered regular training or are unemployed. Most of these measures are co-ordinated by voluntary organisations which are organised in Germany by big welfare corporations affiliated to the churches, the trade unions or the Red Cross. This "parallel system" (Braun 2000) of *vocational youth assistance*

(‘Jugendberufshilfe’) is funded in majority by the employment service or by local or regional programmes. The major objective of vocational youth assistance is to bring young people identified as ”disadvantaged” (or “not trainable”) back into the regular system of training and employment by addressing their individual deficiencies in a compensatory perspective. Correspondingly, the level of (learning and working) contents of the schemes often is rather low and related to manual work, rather than ‘professional’ in nature. Instead of increasing their career prospects, many young people therefore find themselves stigmatised by such schemes. As no alternative paths towards regular employment are available, most young people accept these measures as their last chance. However, many of them get disengaged when they realise that the cooling-out of their aspirations makes it hard to motivate oneself for 3rd or 4th professional choices or for pre-vocational schemes without a clear outcome. Although very few evaluations on mid- and long-term destinations of participants have been undertaken, estimated rates of placement in training or employment after participation are between 20 and 40% (e.g. Galuske 1993; IAB 2000). Nevertheless, the increasing role of vocational youth assistance in the context of declining training opportunities is documented: in 2000 approximately 430,000 young people under 25 have been participating in schemes and measures funded by the employment service (Bundesanstalt 2001). It can be estimated that locally and regionally funded measures accounted for about the same amount.

Young People and the Labour Market

The German discussion on and way of dealing with young people's transitions to work is reflected by the fact that the unemployment rate of young people in Germany has for a long time been the lowest in Europe and, indeed, lower than the average national unemployment rate. According to Muller and Shavit (1998) the German labour market is organized around occupations, i.e. standardized qualifications play a central role in allocation processes. The dual system of vocational training with its high coverage in this context plays a double role of both a vocational training system and a youth labour market with specific arrangements as regards wages, protection etc.. However, as occupational labour market structure and dual system are traditionally related to the manufacturing sector in crafts and industry rather than to the service economy this has had a negative impact on the dynamics of the German (youth) labour market and especially the participation rate of young women. The second major negative impact on the German labour market in the 1990ies has been the unification process and the fundamental re-structuring of the East German economy. On the one hand, the

increase of taxes and social insurance contributions related to the 're-construction East' have had a negative impact on the whole economy. On the other hand, until now the recovery of the East German labour market has not yet been achieved. These developments have led to a considerable increase of youth unemployment in the 1990ies. Positive tendencies since 1999 have affected only the West whilst (youth) unemployment is more than twice as high in East Germany making young East Germans much more dependent on surrogate training or employment schemes (vocational youth assistance).

Another aspect of the German labour market regime is its dependence on a normative and social concept of work as 'vocation'. The three and half year duration of apprenticeship training implies a process of professional socialisation that goes much deeper and requires much more personal commitment in terms of developing a vocational identity than just providing professional skills. Given the individualisation and flexibilisation of labour markets biographical decisions become increasingly contradictory for young men and women. On the one hand the dual system provides orientation, inclusion in the social insurance system and it is even an increasing necessity for entering regular employment. On the other hand, more and more individuals have to cope with not succeeding in finding an apprenticeship that meets their interests, in entering the dual system at all, or have to re-orientate at the second threshold due to a lack of employment opportunities in the sector they have been trained for.

Recent policies

Before the backdrop of a decline of apprenticeship places and rising youth unemployment in the 1990ies national and regional policies addressing youth transitions have concentrated on the dual system and the measures for disadvantaged youth. Highest priority is given to increasing the number of apprenticeship places by reinforcing the corporatist consensus through the "Alliance for Work" (Bündnis für Arbeit) between government, employers and trade unions committing employers to offer training places. In East Germany this is supported by state subsidies. In 1999 public authorities subsidized 50% of all apprenticeships fully or partly and still 41% in 2000. Additionally, there is a higher rate of state-funded apprenticeship in non-company based training workshops run by training providers. These efforts succeeded insofar as the decline of supply of apprenticeship places could be stopped and slightly reversed. Apart from that, training curricula of the dual system professions are modernised as well as new ones (mainly in the IT sector) are developed. The effectiveness of this can not yet be assessed. On the one hand, old professions may just be replaced by new ones (thus not

contributing to the overall supply). On the other hand, segmentation according to education, gender and ethnicity appears to be even stronger in new professions (BMBF, 2000).

As regards *policies for disadvantaged youth* in 1998, the in-coming government implemented an ‘Immediate Action Programme’ under the title ”JUMP - 100,000 jobs for the young” to reduce youth unemployment. With 1 billion € per year it represented a significant political gesture acknowledging the problem constituted by youth unemployment. However, its various elements actually reproduce the structure of the current transition system: increasing the number of apprenticeship places and pre-vocational measures. The only genuine innovations are the introduction of wage subsidies for employers taking on unemployed young people - which until now was conditioned by prior payments to the social insurance, i.e. regular work - and the introduction of outreach measures for disengaged young people in order to influence their orientation towards training and work. However, the mainly quantitative nature of this programme is criticised by many experts: “It was all about having this 'road-sweeping'-effect as quickly as possible.” (social worker quoted in IRIS 2000). As regards the effectiveness of the programme on the one hand officials celebrate the fact that nearly 300,000 young people have been involved in 1999 and 2000. On the other hand, evaluation has shown that only 40% of participants have been in training or employment 6 months after completion of the respective measure (IAB 2001).

2.2 Structures and Trends of Youth Transitions

School Participation

A rise in educational participation occurred in West Germany especially in the 1960ies and 70ies whilst in the 1980ies educational expansion stagnated. Still more than a third of pupils leave school with less than the middle qualification (Realschule) considered in the meantime as the ”educational minimum” for an apprenticeship in most professions (Zenke, 1995).

Table 1: Development of types of school qualifications 1970 - 1999

<i>Year / Type of Qualification</i>	1970	1985	1992	1999
None	19%	8%	8%	9%
Hauptschule	49%	33%	27%	26%
Realschule	21%	36%	40%	40%
Abitur	11%	23%	25%	25%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001

Given the selectivity of the school system it reproduces inequalities on the level of qualifications; according to the recent PISA-study carried out by the OECD more than any other western industrialized country (OECD 2001). Yet, not all types of socio-economic inequality are reflected on the educational level to the same extent. As regards gender we find a higher proportion of females in the higher qualifications. In terms of ethnicity young Non-Germans show definitely higher percentages of lower qualifications than Germans.

Table 2: Percentage of qualification types according to gender in 1999

	Males	Females
None	11%	7%
Hauptschule	29%	23%
Realschule	38%	42%
Abitur	22%	29%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001

Table 3: Percentage of qualification types among Germans and Non-Germans in 1998

	1998 German	Non-German
None	8%	19%
Hauptschule	25%	41%
Realschule	41%	28%
Abitur	26%	10%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001

Regional differences in qualifications reflect the differing regional organisation of school. Higher qualifications on the one hand can be found in regions where social-democratic governments have introduced comprehensive schools to a considerable extent (e.g. Nordrhein-Westfalen; Brandenburg). On the other hand school re-structuring in the East avoided to impose a strictly selective school to a reality which had been structured by a comprehensive secondary education system in the socialist period.

Table 4: Percentage of qualification types according to regions in 1999

	West	Baden-Württemberg	Nordrhein-Westfalen	East	Saxony	Brandenburg
None	8%	8%	6%	11%	12%	9%
Hauptschule	29%	33%	23%	16%	12%	19%
Realschule	38%	38%	42%	46%	49%	45%
Abitur	25%	21%	29%	27%	27%	28%

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001

Participation in Vocational Training

Table 5: Development of demand and supply in the dual system

	Vocational training ratio*		not placed applicants (absolute figures)
	West	East	
1992	122,6	101,5	12,975
1995	105,3	96,6	24,962
1997	98,8	89,8	47,421
2000	102,1	94,3	23,642

Source: BMBF 2001; * = number of available apprenticeship places per 100 applicants

The coincidence of a decline of apprenticeship places and a demographically induced increase of applicants lead to more and more intense competition on the training market. At the same time, the shortage reveals segmentation lines in the dual system:

- *Education:* A shift towards more theoretical content and a rising participation of grammar school leavers in the dual system have led to a general qualification inflation leaving those with basic qualifications in their wake. Comparing the figures of school leavers with only the basic qualification and that of new apprentices with the same qualification one arrives at a ratio of 80%. This means that one in five of them have to trade down their aspirations, to improve their school qualifications, or to accept pre-vocational schemes that not necessarily improve their later training and employment perspectives.
- *Gender:* the lower percentage of young women in the dual system (ca. 40%) has been stable through the decline of training opportunities; young women have therefore tended to orient themselves towards school-based training courses (ca. 12% of all vocational training), particularly in typical female professions such as health and social welfare. Often this means to accept lower (or no) allowances, longer training, age-related entrance regulation and modest employment perspectives of income and mobility.
- *Ethnicity:* young people with a migration background have considerable difficulties passing the "first threshold". Only 40% enter vocational training (see BMBF 2000).
- *Region:* Inasmuch as the dual system depends on the economy to supply apprenticeship places differences between regional labour market affect also the training market. The clearest cleavage in this regard is between *East and West*. Due to a lack of companies investing in training the supply of apprenticeships is characterized by both a high percentage of state subsidies and of non-company-based apprenticeships run by training providers. Apart from the fact that this heavy state investment stands for the decrease of dual responsibility between economy and state, the 'artificiality' of this training supply is reflected by high rates of unemployment at the 2nd threshold from training into employment. In East Germany the rate of unemployed young people with a vocational qualification is much higher than in the West. Apart from the East-West-cleavage there are also differences between urban and rural areas. These however occur less on a quantitative level than in the sense of a qualitative restriction of options.

An additional concern is the high rate of drop-outs: more than 20% of the apprenticeship contracts are dissolved before the certificate, most of them within the first six months. A high percentage of these young people run the risk of not finding another apprenticeship place and/or are too discouraged to continue in investing in qualifications (BMBF, 2000). The high

drop-out rates at this stage can be explained by increased aspirations (due to higher school qualifications and individualized life plans) and by the pressures on young people from parents but also from counsellors of the employment service to enter 'any' apprenticeship in order to avoid unemployment and social exclusion.

Youth Unemployment and Activity Rates

Due to the decline of training and employment opportunities young people since the early 1990s have experienced an increased risk of unemployment. Unlike other European countries, unemployment rates in Germany do not fall after the age of 25, i.e. youth unemployment carries a high risk of continuous precariousness and exclusion. While regional disparities prevail gender differences are of minor relevance.

Table 6: Unemployment of under 25 year olds 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2000

	Unemployment rates acc. to East-West			Unemployment figures acc. to gender		
	Total	West	East	Total	Males	Females
1992				395,739	201,442	194,296
1995	9,5	8,8	12,3	431,103	242,349	211,409
1998	11,8	10,4	17,0	471,709	277,688	194,041
2000	9,5	8	17,0	428,298	258,530	169,768

Source: Bundesanstalt 2001.

With regard to gender there are only minor differences; at the end of the nineties registered unemployment of young men has been slightly higher than of young women. However, a higher rate of inactive females has to be considered. A much more visible segmentation line concerns ethnicity: the unemployment risk of young people from ethnic minorities is twice as high as the average. In principle the risk of long-term unemployment is rather low for young people. In 2000 only 4,7 % of under 25 year olds were unemployed for more than one year. 62% of young unemployed in the West and 45% in the East did not have a vocational qualification. The unemployment rate of young Non-Germans under 25 has been at 12,6 % (as most Non-Germans live in the West where overall unemployment is lower inequalities are even larger). As regards the activity rates of young people the dual system makes comparisons difficult. In some statistics apprentices appear as 'active', in others as in education and training or they account for both categories. According to the European Labour Force Survey in 1998

50% of young Germans were active (stable in the years 1999 and 2000) whilst 68,4% were in education and training (European Commission, 2001; IARD, 2001).

Conclusions

The changes in youth transitions in Germany show both a trend of prolongation and signs of increasing ruptures and risks. A symptom of the prolongation of transitions is the average age of apprentices that increased from 17 years in 1970 to 19 years in 1990 (having stagnated since then). This means that young people are between 20 and 21 when they arrive at the second threshold, i.e. the transition from training to employment, if they do not re-orientate and start a second education or training (ca. 10%; cf. Witzel et al. 1996). Yet, the selective structure of the education system inhibits a further active postponement of transitions through extended education. However, whilst participation in the dual system can be a first step towards independence (see chapter 3) the increasing percentage of young people that have to cope with unemployment surrogate schemes and deviations due to being labelled as 'disadvantaged' makes the question for support by family or welfare state more and more relevant. Due to its limitation to the dual system as way of socio-economic integration the German transition system appears to be paralysed with increasing pre-vocational education and vocational youth assistance being rather a cure of the symptoms than of the disease – as structural problems are addressed by individualizing measures.

3. Family and Welfare

The dominance of the dual system of vocational training and standard work arrangements as main roads of social integration – whilst other trajectories and life courses are not foreseen – reflects the corporatist, employment-centred character of the German welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1990; Gallie & Paugam, 2000). Social security is mainly insurance-based and therefore privileges those included in regular employment. There is a wide debate about whether this model is still appropriate with regard to the change of the labour society towards more flexibilised life courses. These social-political orientations and rules appear to the addressees in an extremely contradictory way as rather than individuals families are addressed. Families which form along middle-class standards – the ‘functioning’ core family consisting of the (male) bread-winner, a mother available for reproductive work and child/children legitimated by a wedding contract and living together in one household – are entitled to comprehensive governmental support. Ostner criticises that family policy still relies on the "real fiction" of the standard family was (Ostner 1987). Family realities in Germany prove to be “more colourful” and more diverse. Therefore social-political regulations and benefits only explain *one* part of the institutional state of the family.

What definitely has influenced the social situation in Germany and revealed to be a considerable challenge for the welfare system in the last decade has been the inequality between East and West emerging from re-unification. Three figures may suffice to illustrate that the necessary basis – a broadly shared standard biography – is lacking in East Germany:

- ten years after re-unification according to collective wage agreements in East Germany average wages are at 85% compared to the West; de facto even below;
- unemployment in 2000 was at 19% in the East compared to 9% in the West
- more than 70% of wage subsidies paid by the employment service spent in the East.

In a critical paper the President of Parliament, Wolfgang Thierse, on the state of former East Germany, alludes to the concept of a “Two-Third-Society” – according to which the (former) German population divides into two thirds welfare winners and one third welfare losers – and at the same time contradicts it: the distribution of wealth in Eastern Germany reflects a mirror image of the West German society. Only one third is able to successfully participate in the wealth of Germany (see ZEIT 02/2001).

3.1 Institutional Level

According to a rough systematization of welfare provisions for families and young adults five kinds of support can be distinguished:

- children-related benefits
- benefits related to the upbringing of children
- benefits related to education and training
- benefits related to the state of being married.
- benefits related to households affected by unemployment and poverty

Children-related benefits

Parents are entitled to child benefit (Kindergeld) which is independent of the family's income. From January 2002 the child benefit is increased by 15 € to 154 € per month for the first, second and third child and 179 € per month for the forth and every other child. Child benefits are paid for every child until the age of 18 years, for unemployed young people under the age of 21, and for young people in education or without apprenticeship up to 27. Apart from that, parents receive a child allowance via tax-reduction. Per child 3,648 € of the annual income are tax-deductible. In addition a tax deductible for child care has been merged with the tax deductible related to children's education and training and will be at 2,160 € for children up to 27 years from 2002.

Apart from the regular benefits and allowances single parents are entitled to an advanced support payment in case the other parent does not or is not able to fulfil his or her maintenance payments. This advanced payment depends on the age of the child and it differs from former East to West Germany from 109 € to 158 € per month.

Recent increases in both these children-related benefits emerged from decision of the Constitutional Court which in recent times has revealed to be the most effective institution as regards family policy (Bundesverfassungsgericht). However, these decisions had no redistribution-effect: of much more concern to the court is obviously the "horizontal tax justice" between families and other life forms (Butterwegge 2001:352).

Benefits related to the upbringing of children

The maternity leave lasts from six weeks before until eight weeks after the birth of a child. During pregnancy and maternity leave women are under protection of dismissal. These

regulations are part of the legal protection of expectant and nursing mothers (Mutterschutz). Mothers and fathers who look after their child and do not work more than 30 hours a week, are entitled to Federal Child Care Allowance (Bundesarziehungs-geld), which is independent of the families income. Parents can choose between a regular amount of 307 € per month for two years and 460 € per month for one year. This regulation came into force at the beginning of 2001. It is therefore part of the new laws concerning family support and ways for a better compatibility of work and family life. Simultaneously, it was decided that male and female employees are entitled to education leave for three years after birth of the child during which protection against dismissal is in effect.

The Child Care Allowance however is criticised for not covering real expenses and has not been updated since its introduction in 1986 - what means a real decrease in value of about 30 %. It was introduced to promote partnership in caring activities between males and females, but in fact only about 1,9 % of all fathers call for it (mostly due to the fact of uneven wages of males and females, so that families cannot afford to renounce to the male wage (cf. Vaskovics & Rost 1999). A comparative survey of careers of East and West German mothers on the biographical effects of the prolonging of the education leave from 18 to 36 month. According to the survey East German women put the new regulations into action more often. Consequently, the so far greatly differing patterns of East and West German mothers seems to converge, although the individual reasons of returning to the work place still correspond to the former regimes: East German women interrupt their working phase for the guaranteed period of time in which they are under protection of dismissal. West German mothers often do not re-enter into working live not before the child starts school (Falk & Schaeper 2001:181ff; see also chapter 3.3). In addition there are also Regional Child Care Allowance programmes (Landesarziehungs-geld) which however vary enormously throughout the different federal states concerning the amount and the regulations of the support.

Besides financial support, the benefit index for families also includes help through advising and through care-giving institutions. The individual offers are supposed to cover all age and to be found on federal, regional and local levels. For example help in emergencies (women's refuges etc.) pregnancy advise, marriage and family counselling, women and girl's counselling, debt counselling, consumer advise etc. Especially low income families with many children and single parents are eligible for subsidized vacations through an offer called "Familienerholung in Deutschland" (family vacation in Germany). In certain cases families are entitled to home help, for example in case of a hospital stay of one parent.

Families with young children (age 3 and older) are entitled to child care in nursery school, day-nursery, or by a childminder. In 1996, about 70% of all 3 to 5-year-old children in all Germany attended day-nurseries or nursery school. Compared to other European countries the former West Germany belongs to those countries with a medium rate of supply of respective institutions whereas since the 1980s until reunification, the GDR guaranteed to a 100 % accommodation for children of the same age (Engster 2001:124ff). This structural imbalance holds till today and shows clearly in the respective numbers of attendance. Whereas in former East Germany 87 % of the 3-to5-year-olds attend a child care facility, it is only 64 % in former West Germany (source: Statistisches Bundesamt, mikro-census). As regards the rate of public child care facilities for the children under 3 years of age the rate stagnates below 3 % (Koch 2001:52).

In Germany children and young people are explicitly entitled to support in their up-bringing by the Children and Youth Assistance Act. In situations where families or family members appear to be over-burdened, young people under 27 years are entitled to special help in upbringing inside or outside the parents' home. At the end of 1995 about 130,000 children in Germany lived outside their parents home in the different forms of care facilities, mainly in foster families and in residential care (community homes). In the last decades new concepts of support have been developed which increasingly consider young people's life-worlds. i.e. flexible and de-centralized assistance with residential care decreasing significantly (Schroeer et al. 2002).

Benefits related to the state of being married

Each year, the state renounces to more than 20 Bill. € of tax incomes by supporting married couples (with children or not) with a special tax reduction system, by which incomes of two partners are not taxed individually, but are summed up and afterwards split again - with the result of very often much lower income taxes to pay (according to estimations of Thiede et al. (1999) even about 62 Bill. €). Splitting effects are the highest, when the wage of one partners is rather high and that of other much lower or inexistent, i.e. privileging couples with one strong breadwinner and an uneven distribution of care work. The amount of tax reduction within the tax-splitting for married couples is almost as high as the amount for child benefits and child related tax reductions; the latter both being one of the core issues of the latest debates on family policies, while the first is not dared to be put into discussion. Tax splitting

accounts for an amount which is even 6 times higher as the amount for Child Care Allowances.

The strong (male) breadwinner model is also relevant with regard to social protection. In contrast to the European welfare states in Germany the risks of health, old age, unemployment and (old age) care are not organised on a tax-funded basis but through a social assurance system to which employers and employees contribute 50% respectively. As regards health, spouse and children up to a certain age are included in a paid-up co-insurance of the breadwinner. In the meantime, for the up-bringing of each child 3 years are acknowledged as contributions to the social assurance system of pensions (which means that only 13 children would qualify for a mother's and housewife's independent pension on an average level).

Benefits related to Education and Training

Apart from child-related benefits for families children and young people who are in post-compulsory education, school-based vocational education or higher education (up to 30 years) are their parents' home are entitled to an educational grant (Bafög) which is means-tested. Depending on the age and status of the child these payments go to the parents or directly to the young people. The educational grant depends on the school type and training level of the young people. Students in post-compulsory general education or school-based vocational education receive a subsidy. Support for university students is partly paid as subsidy and partly as an interest-free loan. The credit has to be paid back when own income starts. For this reason in 1996 only one quarter of all who were eligible really applied for Bafög (see Bäcker et al. 2000:195). The amount of these support payments depends on the kind of training or education and the type of accommodation. For example, students who do not live at their parents home receive a correspondingly higher payment, the highest amount being 565 € per month. In 2000, the new governments of Socialdemocrats and Green Party launched a reform of the educational grant system consisting of the following elements:

- Equality between East and West Germany (a comparison of family wealth in Germany showed that the average family income in East Germany is still substantially lower than in West Germany; therefore the reform thrives for a gradual standardization of developmental funds in all Germany).
- By increasing the threshold of parents' income the range of eligibility has been increased by approx. 80,000 students per year.
- The maximum amount of loan has been fixed at 10,250 €.

Apprentices in the dual system of vocational training are paid an *apprenticeship wage* increasing between the first and the third year. Apprenticeships are included in the sector specific social partners' wage contracts and are included in the social insurance system (health, pension and unemployment). In 1998 the average apprenticeship wage was ca. 550 € with the scaffolders' third year wage at the top (956 €) and the ladies' tailoress' first year at the bottom (180 €; BMBF 2000: 115). In non-company-based apprenticeship training the wage is fixed at 390 €.

In case of hardship, trainees and participants of pre-vocational schemes can claim a means-tested training allowance (Berufsausbildungshilfe), always on condition that the trainee does not live at home any longer. In addition, parents with children in school or professional training can assert a tax deductible during this time (Ausbildungsfreibetrag) which lies between 920 € and 2,147 € per year.

Benefits related to households affected by unemployment and poverty

In cases of unemployment those included in the social assurance receive unemployment benefits which starts at 63% (Arbeitslosengeld) of the last income and gradually declines to 53% (Arbeitslosenhilfe), depending on the duration of previous employment. Additionally, especially in East Germany long-term unemployed tend to be placed in job creation schemes in private firms whilst the wage is subsidised by the employment service. More than 40% of expenses of the national employment service are spent in East Germany (20% of population). Families with very low income and without (or with expired) entitlements to unemployment benefits are entitled to social assistance (Sozialhilfe) to secure the subsistence level which is tax-funded and paid by local authorities. This financial help is divided in support for basic needs (i.e. food, accommodation, cloth, daily requirements), support in special life situations (i.e. during pregnancy, sickness, or in case of permanent care) and support toward minimum wages, when the income is under the subsistence level. The social assistance rate depends on the individual case and the type of family. The basic orientation is provided by the male bread winner model (Dingeldey & Gottschall 2001:31). For example, the so-called 'head of household' receives the total basic rate, which differs according to the different federal states, an average amount being 286 € per month whilst family members receive a certain percentage (80 % for the spouse, 50 – 90 % for the children). Up to the age of 27 years the entitlement of young people depend on the income of the family and on whether they live with their parents or alone. If living with their parents payments go to the 'head of household' and account only

for a percentage of the basic rate. In 1998 4,5% of all 18 to 25 year olds received social assistance (compared to 3,5% of the total population) with females being more concerned than males (Hanesch et al. 2000). Complementary to social assistance, young people in residential care receive *economic youth assistance* which consists of similar regular and purpose-related elements.

“Eligibility for social assistance does not refer to who is able to help himself or who is liable to be supported by family members or other social institutions” (§ 2 of Federal Social Assistance Act). The explicit inferiority of the Sozialhilfe in comparison to all other possible sources of help, especially that of the family and the assumption of a functioning households with its respective role allocation point to the political character of this source of support (cf. Böhnisch & Lenz 1997). Here one can clearly see the emphasis on gainful employment in the federal principle of social justice and welfare state. Each recipient of support, with regard to certain clearly defined exceptions, has to prove himself available for the labour market and also undermine this by way of i.e. letters of application. In contrast to unemployment benefits there are no differences in dependence on social assistance between East and West. This is a further evidence for the attempt to incorporate the Eastern part of Germany in the employment-centred welfare system at any cost (Hanesch et al. 2000). Recent debates have referred to the fact that it is not correct to equate the terms poverty and social assistance. Nonetheless, there are of course parallels between “social welfare careers” and a course into poverty. Over the last years, claims for individual forms of support have developed differently. Between 1963 and 1993, help in special live situations has doubled. In 1993, over 5 million people in Germany received any kind of social assistance. Especially one-parent-families and migrant families are affected. Children and young people of these respective family constellations occupy a risky position in wealth in the German society (Bauereiss et al. 1997:66pp.).

Apart from social assistance, low income households are entitled to *housing benefit* (Wohngeld). Whether they are eligible and the amount of the subsidy depends on the family income, the size of household and the rent. Council houses, subsidized by the Federation and the Federal States, are a further means of support for low income families. Everyone who acquires ground or living space will be rewarded by a home-owner bonus (Eigenheimzulage).

Conclusions

Assessing German welfare provisions with regard to young people in transition between youth and adulthood in general and between school and work in particular shows that ‘being in transition’ is not foreseen as an individual status. Young people are either expected to be in apprenticeship training and thus earning a wage or in education depending on their parents or on means-tested benefits or grants. Other life situations – unemployment without having contributed to the social insurance or participating in schemes of vocational youth assistance – are not considered as statuses deserving particular financial recognition but imply dependence either on the family or on inferior means-tested benefits. Only under few conditions young people have an individual access to social security whilst for most provisions access is indirect through the family. Changes in both young people’s biographies and family forms thus are largely neglected by welfare policies.

3.2 Structural changes in young people’s dependency from family support

Changed family structures - changed systems of mutual support?

In the beginning of the 90ies, initiated among others by a variety of publications of Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (e.g. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1990; see chapter 5), the standard family was strongly questioned, at least sociologically (see Hoffmeister 2001). There were stressed some prominent indicators of such change, which refer to whole Germany:

- increasing rates of divorce (achieving now approximately 30 % of all recent marriages, see Micro-Census 1996),
- increasing rates of single-person households (achieving in urban areas around 50 % of all households),
- increasing rates of single parent families (doubling since the 1970ies to now around 15 %; in 2000, there were almost 3 Mill. single parents - compared to 2,1 Mio in 1991 (BMFSFJ, 2001; Schneider et al. 2001).
- Increase of non-married parents with children: 0,6 millions in 2000 compared to 0,4 Mio in 1991,
- 1,5 million of non-married couples without children in 2000 compared to 1,0 Mio in 1991) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, Bevölkerungsstatistik, www.destatis.de)

However, these trends are not as linear as they appear:

Being married is still the most important way of living together in Germany, even if young men and women are marrying later: the average marriage age of young males in 1999 was 31,0 years, for females 28, 3 years. Having children is still an important issue of life, it is not the only one; and if it is one, it has to be re-conciliated with others (e.g. professional). One indicator for this: the age of females of giving birth to the first child is continuously increasing up to 29,5 years in 1999 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, Bevölkerungsstatistik).

The percentage of females getting children is staying on the same level since the mid seventies: As an average, 100 women are giving birth to 140 children, and this figure of 1,4 seems to be a rather stable one (Bäcker et al. 2000:163). This means: no decreasing tendency in the long run, and it also means: a lot of couples remain - voluntarily or not - without children. Obviously, a lot of these changes have to do with the change of female life during the last three decades. This maybe is one explanation why all these items are heavily discussed as topics of general social and political concern.

Trends of dependency and living at home

The following section largely is based on the longitudinal research project "Family context of youth and young adults: intergenerational socio-economic transfers in change" (Buba et al., 2002), from which data on significant trends in young people's living at their parents home result. These trends will be presented for all Germany, but of course are differentiated according to East and West. In general, these trends consist in:

- a longer stay at home (differently according to gender: young males staying significantly longer than young females) (see Vaskovics 1997:144; Buba et al. 2002);
- a longer financial/economic dependency; one important factor being young people's unemployment, which also implicates a higher need of support. This support differs strongly according to age, with the highest amounts for 21 year olds. This age group could expect a parental support of € 225 (average), but of course this varies strongly according to economic resources and cultural attitudes: 25 % of those who are supported even get more than € 425 while other 25 % can expect less than 50 €/month. And 42 % of young adults can not expect any support at all (Buba et al. 2002).

Table 7: Types of financial support in 1996 (in per-cent and DM)*


Regular payments*	Occasional payments*	Take-over of costs*	General monthly amount (average)*
4,8% (2,8%)			150 €
	14,4% (8,4%)		42 €
		9,2% (5,2%)	42 €
	18,0% (10,4%)		74 €
7,0% (4,1%)			117 €
9,1% (5,3%)			267 €
37,6% (21,8%)			275 €

Source: Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle der Universität Bamberg (Buba et al. 2002)

*) These figures refer to young adults who are supported by their parents economically. The figures in brackets indicate the percentage of these groups with regard to all young adults – including those, who do not get any support.

Biggest differences between East and West can be identified in those types of families where young people get the highest support. In families with moderate or lower support, there are only small differences (see Buba et al. 2002).

The result are patch-work incomes of young adults, where the parents' contribution is diminishing with increasing age of their offsprings. Here again gender differences are notable: young females are much more engaged in earning money and respectively are earlier independent from parents or public support compared to young males (Buba et al. 2002).

Figure 1: Main sources of living according to employment of young adults (West/East), 1996 in per cent (Buba et al., 2002).

Public benefits have much more importance in the east compared to the west – due to higher unemployment of young adults: 14 % of all young adults in the east are living from unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld and Arbeitslosenhilfe), in the west: 11 %

respectively 5 %. Those who are still in training and education, could apply for education-related benefits or grants (e.g. Bafög), which is often completed by parents' support.

Independence (as regards the relation between young adults and their parents) reveals not to be a topic of discussion - neither warrantly nor as regards the lack of possibility to really afford an independent life. The latter is also in depth discussed in Bendit et al. (1999), where a lacking housing policy appropriate to the needs of young people and their often changing life situation are stated - paradoxically, young people are on the other hand most affected by a liberalistic housing policy (see Becker 1999: pp. 81). As a result, following the micro-census of 1996, among 18 - 25 year olds 64 % are living at their parents' home, 12 % are living alone, 8 % with their partner (not married), 13 % as a married couple) (see Bäcker et al. 2000: 163). While in Micro-census data the figure for young people sharing flats is missing – although being of considerable relevance in Germany – the Youth Survey of the German Youth Institute informs also about this living form (see Corneließen 2001:94, scheme 3.2), which seems to be more relevant for females: more than 20 % of 23 year old females are sharing flats with others – in the West as well as in the East, compared to 10 % males.

Buba et al. (2001) even found a variety of 13 types respectively developmental states of living within post-adolescence (see table 8). These types neglect other characteristics and therefore is only a rough attempt to illustrate the variety of living forms. What is striking in this typology:

- In type 1 (young people in education and training living at their parents home), there are in the West significantly more males than females;
 - In type 4 and 5 (nest-leavers living in an own flat – with or without partner), there are significantly more females than males;
 - In type 6 (nest-stayers without partner), there are more than double males, in the east as well as in west;
 - In type 10 (young employed singles), there are significantly more males than females, in the east as well as in the west;
 - In type 11 (young pairs living together - married or not), there are significantly more females;
 - In type 12 (young families): there are more than double females, and
- In type 13 (young single parents), there are almost only females.

Table 8: States of living and developmental phases in post-adolescence: gender-specific Differences (1996) in per-cent (SOFOS 1996, Buba et al. 2002).

No.	Developmental Phases States of living	General		West		East	
		m	F	M	f	m	F
1	Education and Training, living with their parents	21	17	26	19	16	16
2	Education and Training and pendulating between own flat and parents' home (without partner)	11	12	11	14	11	7
3	Education and Training and pendulating (with partner)	1	3	1	2	2	3
4	Nest-Leavers in education and training	6	6	7	9	5	3
5	Nest-Leavers in education and training (with partner)	4	6	4	6	4	5
6	Nest-Stayers, after education and training, without partner	18	7	17	7	18	8
7	Nest-Stayers after education and training (with partner)	1	1	-	1	1	1
8	Employed and pendulating (without partner)	5	4	5	4	5	5
9	Employed, pendulating, with partner)	3	3	3	3	3	4
10	Singles after education and training, own flat	12	8	10	8	13	8
11	Young pairs after education and training, own flat	8	13	9	13	8	12
12	Young families (same as 11 but with child/children)	9	18	6	13	12	23
13	Single parents after education and training, own flat	1	4	1	4	2	5

These 13 types differ significantly as regards transfer of support to and from the parents home. In their comparison over the years (1991 to 1996) Buba et al. note 3 tendencies: earlier bonds within a partnership, which tends to start in the time of training (which is however different in East Germany, see 3.3.); slightly reinforcing bonds towards the parents home - due to prolonged education and training; and a paradoxical development, with a more absolute separation when own work starts on the one hand, and much more forms of mixtures and in-betweens of staying and leaving on the other.

A secondary analysis of recently available representative data (referring to the Shell-study (Jugendwerk 2000), the Youth Survey of the German Youth Institute and the IPOS youth study) on gender differences shows (Corneließen et al. 2001) that young females and males

are very differently involved in their families of origin and respective relationships: again, this study notes that both sexes are staying longer over the years, while females are leaving earlier; it also gives some hypothesis about the reasons why: males can obviously secure a bigger space of real leisure time compared to females (this could be one reason for them to stay longer), both are expected to give support to their parents, but females are much more expected to give emotional and care support (this could be one reasons for them to leave earlier), and females seem to benefit not as much as males economically. Another important reason is young females earlier relationships to partners and their earlier leaving because of living together with their partners (see table above).

However, one has to be careful not to take the above figures as a fixed picture: Buba et al. (2001) show a reversibility of living situations of young people in transition (“yo-yo-isation of transitions”, cf. EGRIS 2001): within a three-year-period of their research (from 1993 to 1996) 30 % of the young people involved moved out of their parents home, 10 % returned (partly in form of pendulating between the parents home and an own room/flat), and for 60 % of the young people there was no change as regards their living place. Buba et al. 2001 summed up different factors of dependency/independency (education and training - of those, who in 1993 had already entered work, three years later 7% were again in training -, housing, partner relationships) and they come to the result, that 'progressive' tendencies (which represent more independence from the parents home) and 'regressive' tendencies (representing more dependency) can be observed in a relation 2 : 1 respectively 3 : 1 (depending on the area concerned). When Buba et al. (2001) draw a more saturated image about families and their possibilities of support, one has to be conscious of the fact that there is a high and even slightly increasing poverty and low income situation among young people. And it is obvious that the poverty rate is higher than the rate of social assistance recipients:

Table 9: Poverty rate (less than 50% of average income) of children and young people in 1998

	Total	West	East
All ages	10,1	9,0	15,0
14 – 17	15,5	12,5	23,8
18 – 24	12,8	11,2	17,9

Source: Becker & Hauser 2001

These risks have increased considerably during the last decades, and the most concerned groups are exactly those children and young people under 25 years of age – their rates almost tripled (Becker & Hauser 2001: table 1 in Butterwege & Klundt 2001a). This rather new (or newly discovered) phenomenon of infantilisation of poverty gave reason for/is also expressed

by a growing body of work dealing with this topic (Bolay & Otto 1997; Hock et al. 2000; Klocke & Hurrelmann 1998; Merten 2001; Otto 1997; Voges 1996, Wenzig 2000).

Following the studies of Butterwegge (2000 and 2001), the socio-economic situation of young people has got worse within the last few years - in the situation of living within their parents home as well as with regard to an own family. Butterwegge & Klundt (2001b) note a considerable polarisation of wealth and consumer potential in the younger generation (and also in the elder one): more than half of all children and young people in Germany are growing up in precarious situations as regards financial security, and respectively housing conditions, consumer potential, and very often: physical and mental health (Kieselbach et al. 2001). Every fifth child respectively young person under the age of 15 is growing up in (income-)poverty, whilst the direct consumer potential of children and young people between 7 and 14 is around 6 billions €/anno (Butterwegge & Klundt 2001b: 53).

Young people and housing

Apart from the fact, that it is just more comfortable to stay at home (this might be the most important reason especially in the case of an own income), most young people have strong economical reasons to stay. They cannot afford living in an own flat, which in Germany is the most costly part of the whole budget for living. According to data of the Youth Survey of the German Youth Institute and of the Federal Office of Statistics for 1993 approx. 90% of young people under 25 living on their own in Germany lived in rented flats. In the West rents accounted for an average of 25% of their income compared to 15% in the East (tendency rising). However, for those with an income below 400 € - e.g. unemployed, university students, apprentices, or young men doing community service instead of military service – rents accounted for more than 50%. In this respect it has to be noted that young people's housing conditions are quite modest with regard to space and quality. Apart from university students eligible for housing in students' homes the German housing market and policies are considered as discriminating against young people. Private landlords often are reluctant to accepting young people as tenants – or at very high rents – and in public housing – except for single mothers – young people are not seen as high priority target (see Bendit et al. 1999).

Support transfers

As regards family support, one of the most important achievements of the study of Buba et al. 2002 is to raise consciousness about the fact of reciprocity between the generations instead of

a one-dimensional supporting line from parents to their offsprings. We therefore distinguish these two directions of support: from parents to their sons and daughters and vice versa.

Monetary transfers from parents to their sons and daughters:

Regarding such transfers it is again the longitudinal study of Buba et al. (2002) which provides the deepest insight as it deals exactly with intergenerational relationships between young people and their parents as “transfer relationships”.

In order not to repeat what already has been said (see above, table 7), only a few remarks in this regard: Parents’ support is not only getting more important as a *main source* of income, but also as an *additional source* of income (see Buba et al. 2002, chapter five, table 2).

BUT: almost every second young man and woman is economically independent from financial transfers of his or her parents respectively has to be independent! Of course, this is differing a lot according to the age of young people: while 80 % of all 18 year olds get financial support, there are only 30 % at the age of 29. All the same, between the age of 27 and 29 every third is financially supported by his or her parents (see Buba et al, chapter five, scheme 3; scheme 4 shows the differences between east and west, with the first getting earlier independent compared to the latter).

Gender differences in this financial support are low, but they are emerging due to the longer stay of males at home: between 22 and 25 year olds, females get more support, but between 26 and 29 year olds, males are getting partly much more than females. This refers to the faster detachment of females from their parents’ home and it indicates a relationship between detachment and financial transfers of parents.

Transfer of non-monetary resources:

By living at the parents home, young people benefit from help and services in and outside the household, occasional support and psycho-social support. Young males with their longer stay at their parents home of course benefit much more from this support. They also benefit significantly more from services carried out mainly by their mothers: cooking, laundry, cleaning, arranging the room, shopping etc.. The “Hotel Mama” seems to be mainly a male phenomenon. One exception is child care, which is only mentioned by young females – and which indicates a) the younger parenthood of females, and b) their much more frequent status as single mothers (while single fathers almost not existing). Every fourth young man between 25 and 29 indicates high or very high support by parents, while in the same age group this is the case for only every tenth female (see Vaskovics 1997:151).

Emotional support:

Young females apparently benefit more than young males from this kind of support, but both feel supported by their parents on a rather high level. It has to be considered that the ups and downs of yo-yo-ized transitions are to a big extent buffered by family transfers (see Buba et al., 2000). Nevertheless, there are significant differences to think about the “normal way to become adult” between young people and their parents (see Buba et al. 2002), and the more normalized understanding of parents setting limits to their support (see chapter 4, expectations of parents by giving support).

Transfers from young males and females to their parents

Although not accounting for financial support, there seem to be a lot of reciprocity as regards other types of support: Kohli et al. (1999) in an analysis of the Old Age-Survey of 1996 state a balanced relationship between 40-54 olds and their sons/daughters as regards non-financial support. One could suppose that young females leaving earlier also do this to step out of support obligations towards their parents home. The higher extent of freedom of males at home (e.g. as regards leisure time) supports this hypothesis. But actually there are just hints from different studies, which do not show a homogenous picture. According to the study of Masche (2000) young females give more intergenerational emotional support compared to young men, and at the same time they receive more of this kind of support from their parents. Although carried out some years ago, the time-budget-study of the Federal Institute of Statistics gives important hints to gender differences as regards the involvement in household activities: Young females between 15 and 30 in the average spend 3 hours and five minutes a day for these activities compared to young men with only 1 hour and 10 minutes (Holz 1998:690). A more differentiated picture of these data. Corneließen (2001:126) shows, that already young females between 12 and 15 are much more engaged in daily housework, and this discrepancy increases with higher ages of the two sexes. Especially remarkable is the development in the cohort of 20- to 23 year old: While men do not change their time spent for daily housework and care, the time spent by young females jumps onto an increase of 50 %, and in the next cohort (24 to 29 year olds) it again almost doubles. In the case study of Ulrike Martiny (1998) on single mother families one interesting result could be found regarding families of single mothers: in these families, sons and daughters feel a stronger obligation to support their mothers and indeed try to do anything to prevent them from poverty.

Conclusions

Besides structural changes of families – with the well-known data about divorce rates, single parents etc. – there are also phenomena which hardly seem to change, e.g. the fertility rates in West Germany. These data are only of interest as a kind of basic information. Much more interesting are striking changes in the relationships between young adults and their parents' generation: the longer dependency of young people due to their longer stay in education and training and the prolonged (financial, practical, emotional) support, the notable differences between the genders (with longer stays in the parental home of males than of females) and between East and West (with young people from East Germany moving out earlier compared to those in the West), decreasing one-way-routes towards independence but more yo-yo-movements according to job-situation or private (relational) situation. In the case of poverty, the picture of these changes clearly shows aspects of constraint rather than of choice.

One has to be careful about the implications of these changes: supporting directions are not only existing from the parents to their children, but also vice versa reinforced by longer stays at home as well. And there are some indicators (e.g. comparisons of time spent for household) that with regard to this traditional work division between the genders is reproduced.

3.3 Structural Changes of Dependency in East Germany

More than a decade ago the public and social science majority agreed on the prognosis that the greatest differences between both German parts would be overcome in less than 10 years. Equally agreed on was the direction which the change would take: the "broken" East would naturally adapt to the West. Recent studies come to a disillusioning result. After ten years of reunification the East seems to be "more uncoupled" than ever before. Economic growth and social developments do not follow the all-German prosperity. On the contrary, the miserable state of the economy in East Germany results into an even greater division between East and West. The growing East-West divergence is also one of the results of the latest Shell-Study, a large-scale survey on youth conditions and attitudes (Jugendwerk 2000). Compared to West Germany, young people from East Germany describe their situation as feeling more troubled. In order to rule out that the perceived divergence is self-constructed, the study examined structures of values, orientation patterns and socio-economic conditions of social territories, also within East and West Germany. Although regions differ a great deal within East or West Germany, the East-West-difference is significant and has not declined (Jugendwerk

2000:116/117, 248ff). Under these circumstances it is advisable to examine the demographic and structural change family constellations of young people separately for East Germany. However, in order not to reproduce stereotypes different cultural developments, normalities and regional traditions on the basis of which young people create their own realities inside their families and under conditions of a reunified Germany.

The political and economic change in the system of the GDR or Middle and Eastern Europe also accelerated the process of modernization in families which is illustrated by demographic indicators from 1985 (about five years before reunification) and 1994:

Table 10: Demographic trends in GDR/East Germany 1985 and 1994 (Statistisches Bundesamt)

	1985	1994
Marriage rate per 1,000 inhabitants	7.9	3.4
Number of first marriage of women per 100 singles	78	38
Average age of women at their first marriage	22.2	26.0
combined birthrate	1.73	0.77
Average age of mothers at the birth of their first child	21.8	26.6
Number of births out of wedlock in per cent	33.8	41.4
Divorce rate per 1,000 inhabitants	3.0	1.5
Number of children affected by divorce per 1,000 marriages	1.0004	1.034

Demographic facts are seen as a seismograph of social changes. According to Nauck and Joos, who were involved in the study of "Socialization and development of children before and after reunification" (1996), these changes in East Germany can not simply be explained by processes of adaptation. Although the picture of family, favored by the GDR regime (working parents with two children) lost its importance after the collapse of the GDR and the extensive regulations of family, work, and housing policies were also declared invalid, according to demographic trends of the last twenty years, the authors were able to prove that before reunification a process of individualization and pluralism had already started in the GDR. "The reunification represented an eclipsing of an already ongoing modernization process by the effects of the transformation process; at least regarding the process of family formation both pointed into the same direction." (Nauck & Joos, 1996) Especially in East Germany differences in cultural and sozio-structural developments lead to special incongruity. Patterns of life from the times of the GDR seem to be "more tenacious" than expected. They seem to develop their own dynamic and can not be explained by the change of the system.

The development concerning the birth rate in the former West Germany and the GDR show similarities as well as differences. During the mid-1960s the birth rate dropped in both

countries, however dramatic changes occurred in the years right after the reunification. The birth rate of East German mothers dropped from 1.57 in 1989 to 0.77 in 1993, compared the birth rate of 1.34 of West German mothers in 1993. This drop is higher compared to the development in all other former Eastern block countries and is seen as a unique phenomenon in the latest course of history. However, since 1995 the birth rate is "recovering" slowly.

Especially rural areas were effected by these low birth rates. The weekly paper DIE ZEIT writes of "the march of the little cohorts" (ZEIT 20/2001) through the institutions in regard of a small town in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Situated in the North East of Germany, between 1987 and 1994, the birth rate of that region dropped from 31,000 to under 9,000 per year. First the day-nurseries closed followed by the shutting down of nursery schools; now children from years with a very low birth rate are entering the school system. A drop in the number of young people affects the whole infrastructure: trade will go down, work will be less available. In particular young families and singles leave the region, especially those parts of the population who under normal conditions produce potential young professionals and contribute to economic prosperity. As a result, the population spectrum is thinned out, leaving old people and those who can not afford to move. This example stands for many rural areas in east Germany. In the survey of Müller et al. (1994) it is pointed out in which complex way youth culture and rural realities of adults interact.

Until reunification growing childlessness was a West German phenomenon. It is expected that in future the level of education and the number of children in East Germany will correlate stronger (Engster 2001). Sterilization of East German women has increased sixfold (Mayer 1995 in: Timmelsdorff 1996:258). Regarding the development of the birth rates another contradiction arises: the different life course patterns in East and West Germany. As it is less and less possible for people (women) in East Germany to reconcile job and family, most people still favor the "old" model, where it was easily possible to reconcile job and family (see excursus). Latest birth rates prove a new polarization between younger women of East and West Germany in regard to those who are favorable of forms of reconciliation of job and family life and those who are not. Whilst in the West the number of one-child-families is declining, the percentage of children in East Germany with no siblings has increased since reunification (1996: 29%, Engster 2001:41).

Nowadays, couples (or women) decide to become parents at a much later point in life. In 1989 the average age of the mother at the birth of her first child was 23 years. Five years later, the average age of the East German women has moved to 27 years. In this connection it is interesting to point to a phenomena in East German family planning: in the GDR it was

common to marry rather early and often. This led to the fact that "nearly the whole generation was married" (Nauck & Joos 1996:254). Nonetheless the proportion of children born out of wedlock are higher in East Germany (42%) than in West Germany. This can be explained by the fact that many East German couples wait to get married till after the first child is born. This pattern can still be found today and is known as the "temporal decoupling of marriage and birth of a child". Other women and rarely also men live together with their child without a close relationship and the number of not married single parents is increasing (Engster 2001).

In the GDR, interest-free loans and preferential treatment in regard of the distribution of apartments of young families "lured" couples into marriage. Today it is the tax and institutional benefits which draws (and frightens of) couples to marriage. The federal German law puts an higher emphasis on the institution of marriage.

In the GDR, couples not only "liked" to get married, they also got divorced more often and with less consequences than in the FRG. Especially single parents were not threatened by social and financial decline after a divorce. Nonetheless the time without contractual relationship was seen as a transitional period, which one thrived to overcome. After reunification the divorce rate dropped significantly. After the take over of West German legal relationships, contractual legitimization of couples found its way back to the marriage emphasizing on providing for each other, which now leads to a stronger dependency. This new trend can be seen as a new symptom of social insecurity: families and matrimony are regarded as available spaces to cope with every day life. Meanwhile, also in East Germany divorce rates increase again, although the yo-yo-effect concerning marriage, which was typical in the GDR, has been stopped.

"Working house wife and mother": digression on gender culture in East Germany

"The biggest differences between family structures of east and west German children lies ... in the gainful employment of their mothers" (Engster 2001:35). Children in East Germany of all age still much more often have a gainful employed mother compared to West German children of the same age. At the same time, women are disproportionately forced out of the labor market. As a result, the proportion of gainful employed mothers of young children from 83% to 65% between 1991 and 1996 (ibid. 111). Whereas differences in the careers of East and West German women seem to have established, there are hardly any differences to be found between East and West German men.

Falk and Schaeper examined similarities and differences of female life plans in East and West Germany, differentiating between gender order and gender culture. During times of fast social changes, differences between institutional regulations and cultural patterns of interpretation can be felt more and more. Especially women with family have to be resistant to the a resultant tension between structural and cultural constructions. Before reunification, the generation of young women with and without family responsibilities experienced a constant career. In East Germany, a double burdened life reconciling work and family was a common pattern. Even more, it was the most important and corporate orientation of female life patterns. This female role model "materialized" (Falk & Schaeper 2001:18ff) in legal, political, and social institutions. The most important aspect of integration under the centralist regime was work. Men and women (in a legal protected setting also children and adolescents) were socialized by the world of work, which included also active parenthood. The common "ideology of mothers" (Keiser 1999:242) "allowed" parents to place their children into public care facilities at a very young age. It was absolutely guaranteed place children into nursery school. In addition, companies and combines had their own health services. Children and young persons joined company-related vacation camps, younger and older mothers took advantage of a maternity leave, being guaranteed to keep their job. Thus, family planning was independent of the vocational career and it was common for people to get married at the end of professional training. "Professional training/college education and starting a family were compatible and were often realized at the same time" (Falk & Schaeper 2001:186). East German women took for granted that a family and professional field were compatible (studies on men still being rare). Nonetheless the East German culture also relied on the actual imbalance of gender: to a certain degree, family work was considered – in contrast to the existing thesis of equality – women's work. The model which built a compromise for West German mothers in gainful employment - realized through part-time employment – was not able to get past the centralist guidelines of full employment (in 1991, 41% of West German women and 22% of East German women were employed in part-time jobs; Statistisches Bundesamt 2001, micro-census).

Consequently, the gender culture which had been developed in the GDR, stands in contradiction with constructions of family and work 'imported' from West Germany. Through the rapid collapse of the East German infrastructure, East German women were faced with individualized patterns of interpretation, which they considered much more conservative; whereby biographies and family structures were undermined. In the Social Report 2001 - based on a representative poll of adults in East Germany taken every year since 1991 on

attitudes, contentment and values - East German women were asked to assess equality of women based on their experiences in both regimes. From today's point of view, 75 % of East German women are of the opinion that the equality of women was more or less realized in the GDR whilst 72% of the East German women feel deprived in that matter now. Even though it is not possible to equate this retrospective with the feelings at that time, this comparison reflects a feeling of lost rights (Social report 2001, press release).

According to the latest Shell-study, the gender culture which existed in the GDR is still handed down today: the majority of the generation of young women in East Germany is in favour of reconciling work and family life (see chapter 4.3, and Keiser 1999:235ff). This stands in contrast to the unemployment rate which has increased enormously over the past years and stabilized on a high level" (Social report 2001, press release). Scientists do not agree on the fact whether this handing down of East German traditions, regarding reconciliation of work and family, at this time, is due to the East German creation of awareness or rather to the new financial constraints. Most East German families have no choice to renounce to a second income because of the level of prosperity.

Falk and Schaeper argue that the family in the GDR "offered less structure" (ibid. 181) than this was the case in West Germany. However, most of the latest surveys point to the fact that the evaluation of family seems to be quite subjective (for example: Social Report 94, Schmidtchen 1997, Jugendwerk 2000). Family is seen as a social network which survived the collapse of the system or at least was able to counterbalance in many ways. Each East German family was forced to react to the change of regime and was asked to re-form under the new West German guidelines regarding standards and structures. Family - as a "connecting institution" (see Krüger 2001) - bunches up fragile life courses, negotiates old and new structures of meaning, and offers support (Drößler 1998:75) between the generations. The integrative impact of family is stretched to its limits. The phenomena of a mobile family proves to be a possible diving board especially for East German families in regard of a new way of gainful employment or professional training. At the same time, family is put to a real test when the family's father has to "travel back and forth" to his work every week, sons and daughters only are in contact with their family on weekends.

Different forms of family can also more and more be found in East Germany. Growing up with both parents present, has lost its significance: in 1996, 75 % of East German children underage live in families of this pattern, which is below the West German level. Parents in

East Germany more often live without a marital contract, six out of ten children grow up with married natural parents (Engster 2001:33). It is more and more common to grow up in a one-parent-family, step-family and so called patchwork families.

Statistics on how long young people over 18 years live at their parents home present different results: whereas official statistics show a tendency to a prolonged stay (Engster 2001:35), a regional representative study: "Youth in East Germany – Life situations and delinquency" (Sturzbecher 2001) for the federal state of Brandenburg – shows a contrasting trend. The study points to the obvious regional differences with regard to family structures. In East Germany as well, life courses in rural areas are more traditional, although also in these areas there is an increase in alternative family forms, not least of all because especially rural areas face a great lack of infrastructure.

Nauck and Joos prove the direct connection between massive changes of the material situation of East German families and the well being of the adolescents. In particular when parents have feelings of uncertainty and are feeling overwhelmed by their own situation this has effects on the biography of children and young people. In this study as well, it is stated that single parents are faced with situations of anomy (see Nauck & Noos 1996:271ff). According to the data of the authors mentioned, the East German transformation process has a different impact on the different ages. In sociopolitical debates it is spoken of an "infantilization of poverty".

Also in East Germany, family as an institution is forced to undergo a process of modernization. Family prepare to be "fit" for a 'biographicized' society (see chapter 5). The new importance of family is a result of the structural inequality and sociopolitical restructuring in East Germany.

Conclusion

A decade after the breakdown of the socialist regime the socio-economic inequality between East and West continues to affect family structures. Family patterns and ways to independence show specific East German orientations. Intergenerational relationships reproduce regional culture of everyday life (normalities) and cause specific dynamics. Trends of modernisation and efforts of adaptation do overlap. The discrepancies between cultural and structural development especially affect the families and cause dramatic demographic developments –in terms of either accelerated or blocked change. Family forms diversify, family formation occurs later and more rarely. Existing possibilities of reconciling family and

work dissolve. Yet the East German work and gender culture is of considerable persistence inasmuch male and female life course are structured by professional work. Life plans and relationship patterns of the younger generation do reflect this development although young people associate emotional support mainly with the family of origin.

3.4. The situation of migrant youth and their families

Family research in Germany mostly is concentrating on the changes of family structures (more single parent families, patch work families, living apart together...) without regarding different cultural or ethnic backgrounds - of main interest are questions of changing gender or generation relations (Peuckert 1999; Maihöfer et al. 2001). For a long time social research in Germany concerning the living and working situation of migrants focussed in a small additional chapter *the* family situation of Turkish migrants - mostly with the impetus of showing their pre-modern, patriarchal, authoritarian and problematic relations. This kind of research (which of course had consequences for the development of concepts of social work) has proved insufficient because

- most studies are deficit oriented - which means that they mostly focus on the problems and inabilities of migrants
- potentials of migrant families are not elaborated
- migration is seen as an extraordinary fact - a settled form of existence is regarded to be “normality” and is taken as comparative referring point
- hardly any secure data are collected about the family situation
- statistics which only focus on the criteria of citizenship neglect the fact of bi-national families with different migration backgrounds
- the differences between the various migrant groups are levelled off and made invisible (see Gogolin 2000)

Against this backdrop the latest official family report of the German government focusing on the situation of migrant families can be seen as a qualitative turning point (BMFSFJ 2000).

The different migrant groups

The situation of migrant families has to be differentiated according to their different legal status as migrants/ foreigners in Germany - these positions define their social, economic and

educational resources (whether they are allowed to work or forced to governmental support, have access to the educational and vocational system, whether they are free in their spatial mobility...). None of the migrants do have the full German civil rights, they are not allowed to vote except in a very local context. The “doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft” (double citizenship) is not possible in Germany - young people have to decide at the age of 18 (or at least with 23 years) whether they want to have the German citizenship or the one of their country of origin, adults can chose the German citizenship after eight years of stay. Anyway, the legal situation of migrants has improved with the new “Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht” (citizenship law) which was passed to the 1.1.2000 and does no longer just claim the ‘ius sanguinis’: especially to those migrants living permanently in Germany the possibilities of naturalization (“Einbürgerung”) are made easier (before the new law this was e.g. not possible before 15 years of stay).

Working migrants

Many migrant families living in Germany came as a response to the German recruitment policy because of labour shortage in the 50ties and 60ties, the so called “Gastarbeiter” (‘guest workers’) - mostly married men came to work and after some years their families followed (“Familiennachzug”). The working places of these men often were low paid and low qualified jobs, that no Germans wanted to do (the stereotype of the Turkish dustman). In the meantime the family start takes place in Germany, but mostly still one member of these families has the experience of migration. One third of the 25 years old migrants, but already two third of the 18 years old migrants are born in Germany, more than half of them only lived in Germany (and know their parent’s countries of origin only as a holidays destination).

Nowadays a new recruitment policy is lanced by the German government: as there are not enough high qualified workers and engineers for the development of new information and communication technologies such people shall be gained for a limited period of time with a so called “green card” (this recruitment policy for high qualified people contrasts with tightening the German refugee and deportation policy).

The “Central Register of Foreigners” reported 7 344 000 migrants in Germany at the end of 1999, accounting for about 9% of the total population. This figure falls in the upper range for a European country. One in four migrants was from a member state of the European Union.

Between 1994 and the end of 1999, the share of foreigners from other EU member states remained at a relatively constant level (25.3%). At the end of 1999, the largest groups among the foreign resident population were the Turks, numbering (28.0%); nationals of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (10.0%); Italians (8.4%); Greeks (5.0%); Poles (4.0%); Croatians (2.9%); Austrians (2.5%), and Bosnians (2.3%).¹

“Aussiedler”

The term “Aussiedler” describes a migrant group who have German ancestors emigrated since the 13th century to regions in Poland, Romania and the former Soviet-Union where they formed German communities (language, education, own schools etc). After the second world war the living conditions of these people in many countries worsened: often they were discriminated and segregated so that they decided to migrate “back home”. According to German law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz bzw. Grundgesetz Art.166a) these migrants are regarded as German citizens with all rights and responsibilities.

At the moment about 3,8 Mio Aussiedler live in Germany and most of them came since 1990. The biggest part of them (98%) are migrants from the GUS (50% from Kasachstan and 40% from Russia). Above-average many young migrants are coming (35,6% are younger than 20 years old) (Bade & Oltmer 1999, Herwatz-Emden 2000).

In the last years the reasons for the Aussiedler to come to Germany changed: in the beginning many of them wanted to come home, they describe Germany as their motherland and they emigrated from discrimination. In the meantime economic reasons and the political situation in the GUS are the main motivation to leave. Besides that more and more families are coming from which just one member is an Aussiedler according to the German law, the other has a Russian origin and is therefore regarded in Germany as a migrant. These people mostly haven't any German language skills.

Arriving in Germany these migrants have - besides all the cultural orientation difficulties - to deal with the pressure of adaptation. As no other migrant group they have to prove immediately that they are German, that they belong to here and that they have the allowance to be here (Schagerl 2000, Goltz 2001). They get special governmental financial support for

¹ Some 25.3% of all foreigners living in German were nationals of EU member states at the end of 1999, following the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden to the EU on 1 January 1995. The largest groups of foreign EU nationals came from Italy (33.1%), Greece (19.6%), Austria (10.0%), Portugal (7.1%), Spain (7.0%), the UK (6.1%) and the Netherlands (6.0%).

the first time (Wiedereingliederungshilfen), but this support was dramatically cut down in the last years and now is only available for the first months. Many of the Aussiedler have to deal with big language problems, most of them do not find any work in the beginning as their former professions, training and education are not accepted according to the German vocational system. Therefore the unemployment rate amongst Aussiedler is quite high and in effect many of them have to claim social assistance. Concerning official statistics there is the problem that hardly any data about Aussiedler are available - as they are Germans by law they do not appear as a separately registered group in statistics.

The living situation of the Aussiedler often can be described by districts or suburban housing estates where they live together in a concentrated way, segregated from the main community - these districts often have the negative image of “Russian ghettos”. This concentration process was intensified by the fact that many Aussiedler tend to move near to their relatives. To avoid further spatial concentration of migrants they are settled according to administrative guidelines: the “Wohnortzuweisungsgesetz” contains a quota of Aussiedler each local authority district has to fulfil (it depends on the relation of inhabitants per space). Aussiedler are not allowed to leave the allocated place of residence before three years except they find work somewhere else.

Refugees

The development of the number of refugees can be seen by the above figures - in 1993 there was a big increase because of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. The decrease of the number of refugees in Germany is also a reaction to a more restrictive migration policy in Germany and the EU.

Table 11: Trends of refugees in Germany 1987 - 1999

1987	700 000	16.5% of all foreigners
1993	1 900 000	28.0% of all foreigners
1997	1 400 000	19.0% of all foreigners
1999	1 200 000	16.3% of all foreigners

Source: federal government's commissioner for foreigner's issues 2000

Table 12: Refugees in Germany according to legal status

Entitled to asylum	185 500
Convention refugees	44 000
Relatives of recognized refugees	130 000
Quota refugees	9 500
Jewish migrants from the follow-up states of the SU	120 500
Foreigners with a residence titel for exceptional purposes	124 000
Homeless foreigners	13 500
De facto refugees	255 000
Asylum seekers	264 000
Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegowina	50 000
(temporary suspension of deportation)	

source: federal government's commissioner for foreigner's issues 2000

Refugees are in fact the most neglected migrant group in Germany - they are forced to live in special camps (asylum seekers are even fenced in) segregated from the local community. Very often a whole family with five or six members has to live in one room, sometimes even two families have to share a bigger room. The adults are not allowed to work (which has been however loosened under the social-democratic-green government), the children can go to regular schools but are only in individual cases allowed to take part in vocational training and measures. They are not allowed to leave their place of residence or to travel around. They do not get financial governmental support but food-packages for their daily life and coupons for clothes or furniture. The psychic pressure on refugees is enormous as they mostly do not have a secure status of residence but are living under the constant threat of deportation (many even spend months in remand pending deportation). Especially for women the situation is hard as reasons like sexual pressure and mutilation are not accepted as reasons for immigration.

The number of illegal refugees living in Germany is not mentioned in official statistics - experts and social workers estimate the figure to 1 500 000. Mostly they work as gardeners, as temporary workers, as cleaners or – especially women – as prostitutes (the “women trade” with Eastern European countries increased dramatically in the last years). There is hardly any quantitative nor qualitative research concerning the situation of legal and illegal refugees – as most research focuses on different generations of working migrants (Laijos 1998, Herwatz-Emden 2000). Actual policy debates are dealing with humanitarian minimum demands:

- a limited legalized state of residence so that they can work for a few months and then return into their home countries
- the possibility for children to go to school (at the moment these children have to be registered with the police)
- the access to medical care
- the decriminalization of persons or organisations which support illegal migrants out of humanitarian reasons.

Regional aspects

The geographical distribution of the migrant population among the federal states and between urban and rural areas is extremely varied. At the end of 1998, over 70% of all foreigners were concentrated in the four large states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia. Their shares amounted to 12.5% in Baden-Württemberg, 12.2% in Hesse, 11.4% in North Rhine-Westphalia and 9.2% in Bavaria. In the states of former West Germany, more than twice as many migrants are to be found in large conurbations than in rural areas, and almost three times as many in the urban centres. Here, migrants account for an average 15% of the total population, and in some cases the figure is even considerably higher. In 1995, the percentages were highest in the cities of Frankfurt am Main (30.1%), Stuttgart (24.1%) and Munich (23.6%)(unfortunately, more recent figures were not available). To forestall any possible misinterpretation, note that these high percentages of migrants are not necessarily indicators of social flash-points or of high rates of criminal offences with a xenophobic motivation. Migrants make up a very small part of the population in the states of former East Germany. Excluding Saxony and Brandenburg (2.3% each), they account for less than two per cent, and only range from 1.8% to 2.8% even in the urban centres of Leipzig, Halle, Dresden, Rostock and Magdeburg.

The labour market situation of migrants

Not surprisingly the labour market situation of migrants can be characterized by a higher unemployment rate, lower qualified jobs and less income. Especially Turkish migrants are a very disadvantaged and stigmatised group - their unemployment rate is about as twice as high as the one of the Germans.

Table 13: Development of unemployment rates of migrants in Western Germany

Year	Absolute numbers	Rate	Males	Females
1980	107.420	5,0	61,066	46,354
1983	292.140	14,7	183.921	108.219
1988	269.531	14,4	165.354	104.177
1993	344.840	15,1	227.394	117.446
1997	521.597	20,4	346.741	174.856
1999	477.728	18,4	305.697	172.030

Source: Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner's Issues 2000

Table 14: Unemployment rates of migrants according to countries of origin (West Germany)

year	general quota	all migrants	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain	Yugoslavia	Turkey
1979	3,2	3,9	3,6	4,5	1,7	2,9	2,3	4,2
1999	11,2	19,7	17,5	16,8	12	12	11,6	22,5

Source: Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigner's Issues 2000

Compared to their parents situation the vocational and labour market situation of young migrants have improved as there are better equipping of the workplaces and more employee workplaces. But still the wages are lower compared with members of the majority group and the positions within the labour market hierarchy are lower. Nevertheless the employment orientation of young migrants is quite high - higher than the one's of the German young people. Whereas e.g. more than 50% of young foreigners actively tried to find a job these were only 22% of the young Germans (Seifert 2000). Other studies prove as well the high education and job orientation of young people (Giest-Warsewa 2000), especially the active life-management of young Turkish women (Fritzsche 2000). This is also an expression of the high parental expectations concerning success and labour market integration.

Language knowledge

Very often studies regard German language knowledge as one of the (or even the) central indicators of social integration - and speaking the language of origin is not accepted by members of the majority group, on the contrary, they interpret it as a wish of segregation of the migrants. School as one of the most influential socialisation institutions for young people has to be regarded quite critical within their concept of monolingual teaching - neglecting the multilingual background of young migrants is quite absurd when one regards the fact that in the year 2000 more than one third of people living in the EU has a migration background. At

elementary school there are so called “integration classes” in which refugees and Aussiedler have to take part in the afternoon (free time) and where special language courses are held.

Seifert and others show that the German language knowledge is a central resource for the educational and professional participation and the access to higher qualified professions but not the only one. It is also highly important be part of social networks where contacts and information are exchanged, communication is organized and social competencies are developed (Seifert 2000, Gogolin 2000).

Economic situation of migrant families

For men the main income for the cost of living is achieved by paid work, for women by the support of the husbands or parents (43,7% German women, 53,8% migrant women, 64,2% Turkish women). Only in Greek households and in bi-national marriages with a foreign husband women take the same role to secure the (financial) costs of living.

Compared to the German population one can state that the main part of both groups of households has an income of 1.500 - 2.000 € per month (24 %). Significant differences can be seen at both ends of this mark: migrant families are much more present in the lower income group of 1.000 - 1.500 € (18 percent to 10 percent of the German households) whereas they are hardly represented in the higher income group of 2.500 € per month onwards. A comparison of the different nationalities shows that Greek families can be the easiest to be found in the higher income whereas this is especially hard for Turkish families. One fifth of the children with an own income is still living at home.

The housing situation of migrant families

The percentage of households with five or more persons decreased the last 15 years significantly to 16 % (compared to 27 % 1985). Italian, Greek and German families have about the same family structures with one or two children whereas Turkish families still live in big households. The living space of foreign families is smaller compared to Germans (especially for families with more than three children - 14.5 m² compared to 23.5 m² per person for German families in the same situation). 90 % of the migrant families live in rented flats (only 55% of the Germans), 6.5% own their flats (43% Germans) and 3,3% live in community housings or refugee camps. Although the flats are smaller the rents are often higher compared to German households.

Conclusions

The research shows the necessity of actual political debates: the lives of young people with a migration background as well as the situation of their families is structured by the fact that Germany for a long time has denied to be a country of immigration and to establish the necessary prerequisites for (young) migrants to participate in all areas of social life. Up to now this is not yet achieved – discrimination of migrants is manifold and complex and can be seen at all levels concerning economic, material, educational and social resources. The younger migrant generation can be divided into two groups: the “winners” who are quite well prepared for the future (concerning language, education and vocation) and the “losers” whose worse starting points is unlikely to be improved by later experiences. The coping strategies developed by (young) migrants (cultural conformity to the German society, ethnic revival, active participation, return into ethnic homogenous family networks etc.) are depending on the biographical and individual situation and on the experiences they make with the members of the German majority group.

3.5 Current debates about Family and Welfare

Political debates about Family and Welfare show a strong tendency neglecting young adults as individuals. They are regarded as students, they are regarded as participants in training, they are regarded as members of (their parents’) household, but they lack the status as individual citizens. One indicator might be the fact that the only kind of social benefits directly addressed to them is the Bafög – except social assistance for those young people whose parents are eligible for social assistance and whom live on their own. Therefore dependency or independency of young men and women appear to be no topic at all. This neglects the fact that young adults in a lot of respects have to act as independents and are fully responsible for the decisions they take. In the context of discourses on “rights and responsibilities” this is even increasing (although – compared to welfare regimes with a more universal access to social benefits – respective policies are more difficult to implement in Germany). This seems to be one of the contradictions of individualization.

Another contradiction lies in highly ideological debates about the disappearing of responsibility and social bonds (a simplistic discourse of individualization), covering a lot of social reality:

- not all divorces do concern children below "maturity", but "only " half of all divorces (nevertheless, 150.000 children are concerned annually, Bäcker et al. 2000: 164);
- there is still a high level of support delivered on the basis of informal social relationships,
- there are emerging new types of families – as a best-case result of divorces the bi-nuclear family with a bi-nuclear type of support (see Bien et al. 2001),
- single households have even more social networking power due to a higher need of social relationships etc.

The same is the case for single parents, whose life situation *is* under considerable economical constraint, but who nevertheless are not adequately represented by the discourse of „problem group“. Not surprisingly, this „problem group“ is regarded as being female (and in fact: single fathers do have a significantly better economical status), and it reveals to turn into deficit ascriptions toward young single mothers, thus ignoring the structural difficulties related to the upbringing of children, especially child-care facilities and reconciliation problems between qualified jobs and the upbringing of children. And by defining single mothers as a problem group, these debates neglect specific achievements e.g. of young mothers in developing networking strategies, management strategies, the use and increase of social resources (see Stauber 1996). Such debates therefore individualise in both directions: by ascribing deficits to one identified „problem group“, they individualise structural problems, and they reduce the agency of individuals. And generally, these debates are debates about how females lead and should lead their life. They complain on individualisation as a kind of "lack of responsibility“, and by this they mean - in the subtext or even overtly – women.

Related to trends of individualisation, concepts of autonomy and dependency a conservative debate focussing on „natalism“ regains power which tries to re-naturalize political debates about structural demands (better infrastructures and better financial support for children and young people, see Butterwege & Klundt 2001b:57). At the same time with the new government in power since 1998, family policy experienced a new renaissance – and family policy reveals to develop one of the topics in the forthcoming election campaign (Pinl 2000). But once again, as some authors criticize (Butterwegge 2001), it is not discussed as a topic of re-distribution of wealth: also the new regulations keep on tax allowances, which, due to tax progression, always have a positive effect for those with higher incomes. And once again, the

regulation which has the strongest effect in this regard, the splitting of income taxes for married couples, has not even been touched. Due to these always unequal effects of monetary benefits or tax allowances, some authors prefer so-called "real transfers": an extension of public institutions for children and young people, more counselling for upbringing, more psychologists and social workers at schools, more day-care for children of all ages, more leisure time offers for young people (Pinl 2001).

Most of the benefits for families refer to parent-child-households accounting for 57% of the German population (Engster 2001:16). Yet, experts in family policies refer to a highly confusing situation: almost all kinds of social benefits include aspects of family policy, but this does not mean that family, or more precisely: having children is a very protected state of living: in contrary, experts are talking about a society (and policies) "structurally ignoring" families and the socio-economic burden they have to carry while being expected to solve almost all kinds of social problems in a quasi organic, "natural", self-understood way (Bäcker et al. 2000:167). Compared to other European countries, Germany belongs to the countries with the lowest birth and the highest childlessness rate. The "aging society" suffers of a lack of children. In 1998 the population in Germany for the first time was lower than in the year before, after in Germany also the dynamic of growth dropped. Because of the extreme decline in the birth rate and at the same time a great loss through internal migration, East Germany is "ageing" faster than West Germany (Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung). The demographic balance of the generations is disturbed noticeably. The social system tries go against this trend by introducing several new reforms (BMFSFJ 2001) although the welfare state alone will not be able to bring this trend to a stop or regulate it. On the contrary, the German system even polarizes the position of those families who raise children and those who do not. For the most part, expenses concerning children are denationalised for governmental transfers are distributed and partitioned by private proceedings (see Nauck & Noss 1996:286ff). Families have to react to what government and the market allow but also what they hinder or ignore. Governmental and scientific surveys on family prove that less and less families are faced with more and more complex constellations. Nonetheless, for most younger and older people, family – even when contradictory – seems to be a central issue of their life plans.

The consciousness of the family is based on different cultural and local ideas. Understanding and care derive from private duties of elder generations in the East and West. But parts of the same elder generation start to withdraw from the social responsibility for the younger

generation referring cynically to the fact that young people can not fulfill the contract of generations in terms of securing pensions. The Shell study from 1997 concludes: „If the labour society becomes problematic, youth becomes a problematic stage of biographical preparation for the society“ (Jugendwerk 1997, p. 13).

Under the old government, the so-called „contract between the generations“ was one of the most popular topics to call for more responsibility for the older generations; again, this topic had a hidden gender agenda, because it ignored the already huge amount of private care work of mainly daughters for their older parents. Under the title of „Justice between generations“ the present government under Schröder reinforces this discourse and tries to legitimise consolidation of statal budgets. „Demography as a means for demagogy“ is the conclusion of Butterwegge & Klundt (2001b:55) by looking at recent debates. They state an illegitimate transfer of the topic „sustainability“ from environmental policy to fiscal policy, which puts the argument „we only have borrowed the globe from our children“ to „we only have borrowed the statal budget from our children“. Against this argument, they state with Brumlik (1999) that while this sentence has its logic as regards the use of non-renewable resources and long-lasting pollution, it lacks logic by looking at social infrastructures paid by fiscal debts: starting from social justice, children would benefit from such investments in the future.

German family policy is based on gender policy which is not appropriate to change the given role division among males and females (see chapters 3.2 and 3.3). Family-related policies are shaping female life courses significantly: in as much there is a force to parental release, there are breaks in female's professional careers, there often are problems of a qualified re-entering into labour market, there is the risk of diminished wages and diminished demands to social security (and therefore risks of poverty in retiring age). Family policy is dealing with the sharing of responsibilities between the state and the family respectively women and therefore always and at the same time is gender policy. On the bottom of these discourses lies the general discourse about care, about the value of different types of socially necessary work, and, together with this, about the uneven distribution of these types of socially needed work between the genders (see Veil 1996; feminist studies extra, volume 18 (2000): Fürsorge – Anerkennung – Arbeit). As long as care is not acknowledged (or only marginally acknowledged) as real work, there will always be a debate about who cares and for which prize. And as long as men do not significantly increase their engagement in care, there will be no change of values. After all debates about the effectiveness of equally paid care work (e.g.

models for other acknowledgement of child care, as for example the model „Erziehungsgehalt 2000“ (Leipert & Opielka 1998; Koch 2001), it seems to be clear: care has to be re-valuated, but it will always be a different kind of work, which includes aspects that cannot be expressed economically. On the other hand, there are a lot of professions which share this characteristic.

4. Transitions, Support and Dependency in Subjective Perspective

4.1 Subjective orientations of young people

In the previous sections of this report it has been shown that institutional arrangements of both transitions to work and support have not changed very much and they do not have changed in a way considering addressees of policies as individuals constructing their biographies but in relation to the institution of the standard life course. However, as socio-economic and socio-cultural trends of individualisation have constantly progressed individuals increasingly have experienced discrepancies between the social structures influencing their lives and the statal institutions regulating them. In order to understand how individuals cope with social integration (or risks of exclusion) their subjective orientations have become more and more relevant. This accounts even more for young people for whom the social risks result in biographical uncertainty.

Subjective dimensions of young people's transitions to work

In principle, young people in Germany have a very positive motivation towards work in general and to follow the routes provided by the transition system in particular. This is documented by quantitative surveys (Jugendwerk 1997; 2000; Schmidtchen 1997), by qualitative studies (Baethge et al. 1988; Raab 1996; Keddi et al. 1999; Geissler & Oechsle 2001; IRIS 2000) and as well by constantly high numbers of applicants for vocational training and users of vocational youth assistance measures. Most young people accept the biographical orientation provided by the vocational system and they realize that the probability to enter into stable employment depends on a solid training certificate. However, it has become more and more difficult to construct identity and biography on occupational choices.

On the one hand, the competition on the ‘training market’ forces an increasing share of young people to accept career opportunities that do not correspond to their interests. The

identification which is necessary for internalizing not only professional skills but also professional identity – and last not least to stand a three and half year training period – is difficult to maintain under such conditions. Additionally, this socialisatory demand contradicts the flexibilisation of life plans – the necessity to keep options open – that most young people have accepted as adequate in contexts of postmodern uncertainty (Zoll 1993; Müller 1996). “In general it can not become presupposed ... that young adults refer to waged work in their biographic action and timing. At the same time relationships formed in the young adult stage not necessarily represent a limitation of professional choice” (Geissler & Oechsle 2001: 89).

The constantly high percentage of drop outs from apprenticeship training (25%) has to be interpreted as a result of training decisions taken under the pressure of missing an opportunity but without being compatible with other biographical orientations and aspects of life. At the same time it can be estimated that 5-10% of those who complete an apprenticeship start another training course or study afterwards (Witzel et al. 1996; Nuglisch & Pfendtner 1998). Problems of identification and motivation are extremely high for those who are forced to trade down their aspirations and to enter pre-vocational schemes or training courses for disadvantaged youth which only in few cases effectively improve the career prospects of those involved. As at the same time alternative trajectories do not exist or are not recognized (in the sense that employers rely on standardized certificates rather than on young people's personal experiences and access to both further education or training and social security depends on participation in regular training) and strategies of increasing options by accumulating cultural capital are limited by the selective education system young people balance between commitment and scepticism as regards the regular trajectories. On the one hand, they realize that they have to come to terms with them, on the other hand they do not expect very much in terms of meaningful support.

Especially, the vocational counselling and the employment service have a rather bad reputation among young people. They criticize that counselling suffers from a lack of time and they do not feel considered as individuals but administrated as cases. They assume that priority is given to placing all applicants to the available apprenticeship places – and to keep unemployment figures low – rather than to respect and to support subjective interests (Behrens & Brown, 1994; Nuglisch & Pfendtner 1998). As regards vocational youth assistance the perceptions are more ambiguous. On the one hand, young people experience measures for disadvantaged youth as stigmatizing (for ‘the losers’) and they doubt whether they are in the grade to solve problems of youth unemployment. On the other hand, they

describe the support and engagement of social workers in very positive terms as the only ones taking them seriously (cf. Galuske 1993; Haunert & Lang 1994; Schäfer 1997; Schittenhelm 1998).

Due to the rigidly standardized transition system young Germans only to a limited extent can compensate the contradictory relationship with formal institutions by informal support. In terms of orientational support most young people are aware that their parents lack the knowledge and experiences necessary to navigate through the modernized and flexibilized transition system. Even those with restricted opportunities due to low qualifications as for example young people in schemes of vocational youth assistance distance themselves from their parents who “just accepted any job”. In contrast, they claim options for choice. However, finding themselves stuck in traps of disorientation they sometimes willingly accept parental advice although they doubt its validity (Hoose & Vorholt 1997; Jugendwerk 1997; 2000). As regards peer support networks on the one hand function as distributors of information and role models whilst “work” or “unemployment” rarely are discussed amongst friends (Stauber & Walther, 1995).

As regards young migrants they as well show a very high work orientation (Bendit 1997). Whilst in the end of the 1990ies more than 50% of young migrants actively tried to find a job these were only 22% of the young Germans (Seifert 2000). This does not necessarily mean that their work orientation is higher but definitely more pragmatic. Compared to young Germans who have internalized the demand of vocational orientation and try to enter the regular training system at any cost young migrants more often accept unskilled jobs when training is not available at conditions acceptable for them. At the same time they more often renounce to both benefits and counselling by the employment service and prefer individual (informal) strategies (cf. Giest-Warsewa 2000). This is also an expression of the high parental expectations concerning success and labour market integration. Apart from this, a recent youth study (the Shell study) showed the increasingly active life-management of young Turkish women (Jugendwerk 2000).

Young people's orientations towards the family of origin, partnership and own family

First of all, it is important to consider the subjective meanings of all data concerning the change of families. For example: what do the increasing divorce rates mean? Following Rosemarie Nave-Herz, they do not represent the break-down of family, but rather indicate the

high relevance of a satisfying partnership of married partners today (Nave-Herz 1998:306). Also the increasing rates of single parenthood must not be understood in an one-dimensional way: there is a broad spectrum of reasons why young women (and some young males) prefer to stay alone with their child/children. And to them, at least for the moment, it reveals to be the better option, also (or even mainly) with regard to the relationship to the child. These examples show that the interpretation of the well-known data is decisive, and that this interpretations are depending on the subjective meanings young people give them.

Following the data of the Shell-study (Jugendwerk 2000) Corneließen et al. (2000) note differences in relevance of partnership and own family between the genders and the age groups of young people: Compared to other relational life topics as „friends“, „partnership“, „own family and own children“, the relevance of „parents and siblings“ to young females and males stays on a rather high level during all their youth and young adulthood from 16 to 29, with female rankings always a little bit higher than males. These changes of relevance can easily be explained by changed living situation (e.g. own partnership more relevant as relationships to parents and siblings for young people between 24 and 29 and thus in an age where a lot of them live in an own partnership (see Corneließen et al. 2000:106). Also gender differences – with males giving less importance to own partnership and family compared to females at the same age – can be explained by this, because young females are earlier living together with a partner. But if young men start living in an own partnership, these topics also get more and more important to them (following the DJI-youth-survey, 91% males who have already a stable partnership find the item „partnership“ highly important, meanwhile those without stable partnership find it only to 71,4 %, see Corneließen 2000:105). While differences in female and male attitudes towards partnership decrease with increasing age, it is striking that these gender differences even are reinforced with regard to „own family and children“. This gender difference is even more significant in East Germany (see scheme 3.6 in Corneließen 2000:107).

When partnerships break down, the family of origin in most cases becomes important again in terms of housing, support, and in the case of single parenthood of child care (Stauber 1996).

As regards the expectations young people have towards their parents (concerning support), results from a different research context (Stauber 2002) show that there rather often *is* a lot of support, even if it is not explicitly expected or called for. Young adults engaged in youth cultures and trying to make a living out of this engagement for example mention the high

financial (credits and donations), juridical, concrete (e.g. renovation works, help to run the economy) and psychological support. They do not really call for this support (see below, motives of parents), but they receive it gratefully.

Young adults: attitudes towards own family in the context of complex life plans

Subjective attitudes of young males and females between 14 and 23 towards „partnership“ and „family“ seem to be investigated in a relatively satisfying way. But these attitudes always have to be related with attitudes towards other aspects of life, e.g. training and work.

It is astonishing, following the Shell-study that already the cohort of 22 – 24 year old females begin to lower their professional aspirations (although having better schooling careers than males) – because of starting to have also other life plans in their mind (Jugendwerk 2000). This is a clear signal that they anticipate difficulties of reconciliation, and that they do not expect any substantial support –neither from public institutions nor from their future partners. The picture is contradictory: Meanwhile the "traditional core family" is losing significance, young people still regard marriage and having child/children as one of the main topics of their life course (Fuchs-Henritz in Shell 2000:72).

Of course, the perspective in which studies are carried out, is decisive for results in this regard – this reveals to be even more important as the situation *is* full of contradictions (not only subjective, but also structural ones). In surveys as the ALLBUS for example (a representative survey which is replicated every 4 years) under the title „attitudes towards marriage and family“ only the „role of the woman in family and profession“ is implicated – and there is no equivalent concerning the role of the man in family and profession. The link between marriage, family and woman seems to be self-understood, and the most necessary change of male life planning and decisions is kept outside - already in the concept of the study (see critical comments in Cornelißen et al. 2000: 117).

In qualitative studies young people's life plans at first sight appear to be similar for young men and women with the same importance being given to family and work (Popp 1997). However, young men anticipate that in future they will not reduce their career aspirations in order to share family obligations with their partners, exceptions being made for young men from alternative scenes and with academic careers (May 1995). Yet, often their aspiration for self-fulfilling work is not compatible with part-time work because of family obligations and therefore reality is much different from life plans (Fthenakis & Minsel 2001). Young women are torn between aspirations for their "own lives" and their consciousness of having to

reconcile work and family largely on their own (Baethge et al. 1988; Popp 1997). In their research, Oechsle and Geissler (1996) however have found only a minority of young women's life plans exclusively structured by a professional career. Whilst the life plans of a majority of young women stands for a variety of 'inbetweens' resulting in "double life plans", there is a surprisingly large share of women opting for a traditional – yet consciously chosen and reflected – life as mother and housewife; one possibility to 'solve' demands of re-conciliation. Especially, for the younger ones up to the age of 23 the main issue is partnership, not marriage. Similarly, the study „life topics of young women“ of Keddi et al. (1999) stresses that the „double female life concept“ with the main question of reconciliation of family and work reveals to be not the only one: life topics are different, complex, and ambivalent, with family and work not being the only structuring components of the female life plan.

As first results from interviews with young adults in vocational youth assistance schemes show (Pohl et al. 2002), answers to priorities in life are highly dependant on the present life situation. That means for example: when young people are interviewed who just have started training or education, and given the case that they are motivated to successfully go through this course/this scheme, he or she will put the focus on that. And if asked about other life plans, very often the answer is: „oh, that comes much later“ – the first and for the moment single aim is to successfully complete relevant qualifications. That means: all answers regarding life plans have to be contextualised as regards the present life situation and the priorities he or she has for the moment.

Conclusions

The general focus on subjective orientations of young people regards coping with the discrepancy between statal regulation of transitions and transitions' reality shaped by structural change as well as changed subjective aspirations. Whilst young people are highly motivated – and willing to compromise – to enter the regular system of training and work, those who are channelled into surrogate schemes suffer from de-motivation. Parental support deriving from extended dependency is necessary (and often even preferred to welfare), but limited in its effectiveness – something young people are clearly aware of. Nevertheless, the family of origin – if available – remains an important support structure. Attitudes towards an own family are highly interrelated with other aspects of life planning which cannot be reduced to the well-known reconciliation conflict between family and work, - although still being a core conflict. Due to uneven distribution of responsibility between the genders for all kind of

care work this is mainly a female conflict; research, on the question in how far it is also an issue for young men and how this issue changes during male and female biographies and the development of partnerships. Whilst parental support for their young adult off-spring is not foreseen in the assumption of normality the provision of support where necessary due to de-standardized transitions and where possible with regard to possibilities seems to be self-evident: this reflects the importance of emotional bonds and responsibility.

4.2 Subjective orientations of parents

In the longitudinal study of Buba et al. (2002), which included also qualitative methods, young people and parents were interviewed. Following these results, the issue of „negotiation“ (du Bois-Reymond 1999?) has to be relativated, at least as regards to support. Support mostly is given according to a certain situation or to a certain understanding of what are new demands, new needs in a next step of young people's transition. They are not independent from what parents think should be „normal“ as regards these transitions. But in most cases transfers are not strictly skipped – there are zones of transfers which allow a kind of smooth retiring or upgrading of transfers (see Buba et al 2002:chapter 4).

Buba et al (2002) identify three central motives of parents to support their off-springs either emotionally or economically:

- the never ending care and responsibility as internalised norm of parents, which leads to a kind of self-understood support attitude: This is „quite normal“, this is something „not to be thought about“, or something „one does not know exactly why one does it“. This support is rationalized and normalized with solidarity („at least we are a family“), or with indispensability („as long as they need me, I will be there for them“), or with tradition („my parents gave the same support to me“), or with minimalization („I give them just a little bit of support“), or with parental task („I wanted the child, and this belongs to it“), or with own interests („I love it to support my children“).
- The second motive is the projection of own wishes and desires to the child/children and a lot of expectations put on them. Reality forces to adapt these expectations – more easier, if the latter are open enough (as regards life time schedules children should have achieved). If such expectations are disappointed (e.g. „wrong partner“, „wrong profession“) parents mostly do not reduce contact or economical support, but the transfer of solidarity.
- Gratifications as thank and acknowledgement, as re-transfer or as fulfilled expectations.

4.3 Subjective orientations of young people and their families in East Germany

Young adults

According to a representative youth survey, there are obvious differences in the perception of time and history between East and West German youth (cf. Schmidtchen 1997). In East Germany, people between the age of 15 and 30 perceive time that has passed since the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the GDR, as longer than the average person in West Germany. Schmidtchen interprets this result as a proof for a comparable higher concentration of events for the East Germans: "Young people in the East had more to deal with it as the one in the west. In the east the unification was an event, which directly influenced the biography" (Schmidtchen, 1997: 73). The change of the regime represents an extraordinary and structuring power. The period of time between the fall of the Berlin wall, and the political change is referred to as 'Wende' ('turn' or change). It has been a breach in every East German family's chronicle. In the East families tend to divide into the time before and after 'Wende'. This has not inevitably happened in West German families. They often view events in the past of their family life are more meaningful.

From the contemporary perspective, for the generation of the today 20 to 30 years old this means that former phases of their biography got a new meaning or were (worthlessness). Their social orientation has changed. The idea of the youth in the GDR respectively the former FRG did not follow the same system of interpretation. "The GDR regime paid court to young people, the youth did matter... They had a 100 % guarantee to get a corresponding job after their vocational training, to find a workplace." (Schmidtchen 1997: 109). Publicity and research outlined an uncertain youth, who - now abandoned by the state - seems to be left into their own responsibility. Noticeably, in many comparing studies (youth in East Germany before and after the collapse of the regime, and compared to youth in West Germany) the "youth of the 'Wende'" ("Wendejugend") has been characterized by their potential of violence (especially at school and with regard to foreigners). Youth once seemed to be directed centralistic and undemanding. On the other hand, it is exactly East German youth who live out a suppressed hedonism: expecting much without working too hard (cf. Sturzbecher 2001). The argument of East German myths and the stigmatization belong to the new attitude of justification by those who have been socialized in East Germany. Young people are forced to deal with this blame. They are judged this way whether they have "arrived" in the west or not. Youth believes to be misjudged about their individuality and

subjectivity, young person often experience the sad undermining of the generation of their parents. Schmidtchen asks for the limit of justice referring to the process of the unification: the majority does not feel that their investment for the history they have in common is being recognized. “Unspecific uncertainty and the feeling of defeat are discernible in nearly one third of the young people” (Schmidtchen 1997: 74).

Young East Germans connect justice mainly with the equality of chances at school, in vocational training or profession. In these fields they experience themselves as disadvantaged in their own native country. Self efficiency as a young East German in the unified Germany does show itself still contradictory despite rising material participation. All together the young women are more skeptical in their judgment of their relation to the unified Germany.

In the past few years, a change of the perspectives has initiated. In order to get a closer look the views of young people, new studies focus more on subjective categories like attitudes and patterns of orientation (Schmidtchen 1997; Jugendwerk 2000). Important issues as persons to whom young people relate and the level of social networking are taken into consideration. This section is based on the results of both studies. Within the framework of a seminar held at the Technical University of Dresden a 20-year-old young man was interviewed concerning his life concept between family, job and growing-up (Schwarz 2001; excerpts of this little exploration are inserted in italics in the following paragraph).

The Shell-study (Jugendwerk 2000) describes German youth as, in general, being obviously confident concerning their personal and social future. The authors interpret this as result of increased biographical efforts. Especially in the East, young people derive their personal confidence more from the results of their own performance. The social future in the East is assessed more rational which is reflected by young people’s dramatic drop of interest in politics. After reunification, trust in East German politics and public institutions seems to be hurt or disappointed. According to that, the available personal resources are managed in a more optimistic and calculable way: “help yourself”. ‘Self-management’ becomes a value cultivated in the East and the West - but with different models of argumentation. East Germans (more often than the West Germans) associate with self-management moments of self-discipline and suspending personal wishes. Young people from East Germany reveal a higher sense for achievement whereby the authors refute the idea of the confused and/or hedonistic youth in East Germany.

”...especially in my profession there are probably hundreds of thousand... electricians who all want to work and there are average ones and excellent ones...right now I take everything I get offered...and that is paid, I do the extra year (of education) for sure

...And at home nobody is waiting for me anyway. Maybe when one is older, has a family and works longer every day, one will have quite different problems at home than now."

Young people with limited possibilities and resources appear to be pessimistic. "Good parts of young people initiate their biographies therefore uncertainly and in a helpless mood. They often have received little help on their way from their parents; they have not improved because of their education and often because of their own attitude (hold on to the present, preference of fun etc.). They have little options to adapt to the change in every area of life. Even not to use a chance - and they are aware of this (...) It could be around 10 % of the young people" (Jugendwerk 2000: 49). Especially groups of East German and migrant young adults account for those "left behind" (cf. section 4.3).

A similar description of the life concepts is given by Schmidtchen: "Zest of life is spread as well under the young people from former East Germany as in West Germany, but the worries are more noticeable in the east. Comparative analysis shows that fun is most important for 41 % of the youth in the West but only for 26 % in the East." (Schmidtchen 1997: 88). However, even Schmidtchen does not come to the conclusion of a trend of resignation. On the contrary, 77 % of the youth in the East and only 59 % in the West strive for changes.

With the background of this public opinion, typical East German biographic options and plans arise. Everyday life and future orientate strongly at present challenges. East German young people are definitely on the point of time. Waiting and putting of life decisions require sufficient resources. They plan and think in more compact units of time; they live "as if".

"...such a feeling of insecurity. Well, I ... somehow I have always to know how it goes on at school, I always had to have an education. I would have had it if I had to do something like pre-vocational education ... or, if I'm done now – I will probably pass (the final examination) tomorrow, let's hope, and I will go to the company on Monday and sign the work contract and everything goes on from there, everything is settled."

Family is less end in itself, tradition or protest, it is also a "utilitarian variation to the emotional, social and biographic self-assurance in reaction of the field of society" (Jugendwerk 2000: 131). East Germans – in analogy to West Germans of the same age - emphasize the emotional importance of family and family as offering security .

"...because my mother has always looked after, quite touchingly (...) when you were sick, she was always running around. Simply, this is where all this about values comes from....once in a while you need to notice, as a child, how things are..., but for that it wasn't that bad....and then some time or other there was traveling by backpack and so on. Well, there is also this feeling of freedom (...) But that was more my brother to influence me in this way. ... Right now I still live at home, because financially this is easier. It would

work but I don't want to put up with that financially (...) And really I don't have any problems with my parents, I can talk to them about everything and why should I move out this early? In one year roughly, I count on moving out, then I'll try the whole independence business and to master my every-day life. ...and then I'd like to have a family, one child, well right now I don't want to have more than one child (...) I think two kids are nice but (I) can't imagine two kids right now, it wouldn't work financially ... not like in former times, when having two children really wasn't a problem ..."

Family cultures in East Germany reflect a growing liberalization of generations and gender. Liberal and for the East traditional educational values – in a strongly stylized way – are being communicated and negotiated. According to the study carried out in Brandenburg 53 % of young people confirm a high family solidarity. Nonetheless, boys are much more content with the climate in the family than girls (Sturzbecher 2001: 74). According to the majority of the youth in Brandenburg, the up-bringing is described as not being much repressive – the trend is decreasing (ibid.: 69). In the interpretation of the results, Sturzbecher points to the narrow degree of growing liberalization and actual neglect of family care. As stated by the author, the new fragility of the work biographies and as a result the loss of prosperity is responsible for the stated discontentment by parts of the young people, because now parents pay (or are forced to pay) much more attention to their own biographical planning. In particular adolescents from one-parent-families and those who do not have any or more than three siblings, suffer disproportionately high from decreasing availability of their parents.

Family is rarely the only meaning of life. Young East Germans also state a high motivation for profession. The motives in case of their choice of profession however are different. In the East the financial motives - for both genders – are stronger than in the West. For young East Germans careers are more connected with security compared to the West, where social motives and desires of self-fulfillment play a more important role. The respective level of importance of the labor market situation does influence the choice of apprenticeship and profession.

"But it is simply the insecurity because of the limited jobs, that one...wants to keep ones job and therefore show commitment. If there were enough jobs, maybe you wouldn't do that ...If now the job situation becomes even worse and you have no choice, than I would also do it (move to West Germany)"

The strongly increased willingness of East Germans to move to the west is a far-reaching answer to the limited security of their futures. The Social Report 2001 verifies an reinforced migration of the 25-year-olds from former East to West Germany (Sozialreport 2001). The emphasis of their own interests is more important to young people in the East than for young

people of the same age in the West (cf. Jugendwerk 2000, Schmidtchen 1997). However, Schmidtchen comes to another result: 48 % of the youth in the West, but only 42 % in the East can imagine to change place for the reason of finding an apprenticeship. Readiness for mobility depends also on the level of education of the family of origin. Leaving the parental home can be justified by the situation of mobility and pressure. Asked for concrete plans the relation between youth in East and West Germany in regard of mobility differs: 29 % in the East and 21 % in the West actually plan to move (Schmidtchen 1997: 133pp.).

The Shell-study identifies a very active part of the group: young East German women. Young women in the East strive for a higher level of education than men in the same age. Young women ascribe high importance to self-management and discipline. They are willing to invest: especially girls and young women state a high mobility rate. These are results of the study, although girls and young women are not socially advantaged. Only 15 % of Eastern young women feel well prepared for the future compared to more than 20 % of those in the West (Jugendwerk 2000: 290). “The mood of living of girls” (p. 299) is based on an enormous biographical effort. Equally matched professional and familiar perspectives are striven for by 60 % of the youth in the east and 44 % in the west (Schmidtchen 1997: 126). But to the extent to which young adults grow into society, the model of reconciliation loses its drafting power in the east. The gender gap opens with the rising age. Correspondingly traditional female patterns of orientation therefore regain importance for young women.

Parents

Young people view their parents in their importance as adviser and emotional mirror of people clearly before the peers (cf. Drößler 1998). The power of socialization through peers will not be questioned but it seems that young people satisfy their different needs in different social networks. The family seems to be the preferred place to get security and care. Parental advice is asked for, although or even because of the huge biographical breaches the generation of the parents in East Germany already had to deal with and still have.

The study “Ten years after reunification” (in Die ZEIT 40/2000) describes East Germans as having grown subjective confidence and stabilization in all situations. In contrast, the Social Report 2001 describes a change of this mood. Hope and expectations for possible changes, which East Germans connect with the change of government (1998), seem to be stopped in the meanwhile. Just only 56 % of the East Germans state satisfaction. According to their self-description in both studies they see themselves as registered as new citizens of the Federal

Republic. The majority of East Germans (51 %) perceive themselves as working class, 34 % as middle classes and only 3 percent as upper class. Apart from that, East German society misses the category of established older people: 45-60-year-old people classify themselves lower than younger groups of age. Especially this generation is marked by the experienced undermining of authorities. On the other hand, higher educated individuals and those with an attractive job state higher zest for life and personal profit. For East Germans, social justice mainly means the reduction of the “gap of justice between East and West” (Social Report 2001, press release). Since re-unification, East German self-understanding formulates itself in comparison to the West, the constant questioning of the achieved “western level” brings East Germans always back to their “individual” past: it seems that they have to prove their lives as free citizens. “The inheritance weighs heavy, if people are forced to be like sheep and to miss experiences.” (Keller 2001: 38). After all, there is still a (decreasing) minority of East Germans who long for the time of the GDR.

Every second East German complains about less time for his private life as well as a drop in the cohesion of friends (Infratest 2000). Germany is judged by the East Germans as hostile to children. A majority of 36 % thinks that education of their children is worse than in the GDR. Half of the respondents expect worse chances of development for their own offspring.

All together the result of life of old people is similar to the one of young people: personal profit, but also losses in quality of life are ascribed less to the system than to personal abilities. Parents and children feel the pressure from the working society - the relation has still to be found between self-assertion and adjustment. Parents and children see themselves confronted with similar challenges.

A study by Huinink and Mayer (1995) on “life during the time of the GDR and after” shows that in the GDR-society informal patterns of negotiation were established despite of a high density of regulation and biographical organization. Rather than the use of social niches they describe a certain ability of re-interpretation. So far, formal structures have been used in order to distinguish whether seem to be useful for the own plan of life. They refer to the “sneakiness of the individual”, to push through the own options of life in a system with strong social control. The imagination to surrender passively in the everyday life of a dictatorship becomes disproved. Parents as well as children and young people developed competencies and strategies for action. The noticeable trend of relationships of families in the East of the country took another turn. It was neither a trend of rationalization in the GDR society which has modernized families nor a wide anti-authoritarian movement that shaped the interaction style of the generation. Starting from the families, a culture of everyday life developed which

allowed the single person to compare formal and informal logic. The family was the preferred place to make biographical decisions. Naturally, the family was also the place of high emotional and affective tension. However, cohesion in the family develops also through the management of conflict situations (cf. Schmidtchen 1997, Drößler 1998, Keller 2001).

In the study of Schmidtchen it is confirmed that the familiar traditions carry through until the present. Asked how many social roles they adopt successfully, young people's answers allow a conclusion of the value and importance of each role. Being boy or girl friend is more important in both parts of Germany than being son or daughter. The role of a son or daughter is more emphasized in the East than in the West. Szydlík comes to a similar result in his research about the perceived tension between parents and adult children (1997). East Germans cultivate close relationships between the generations. The closest relationship exist between mothers and daughters. The relations between siblings (except the relationship between sisters) as well as between grandchildren and grandparents become also assessed as closer than in the West. All together, the variety of roles is higher in East Germany. However, a variety of roles does not guarantee a successful generational conveying of social competence. Roles refer to expectations, they automatically include a normative request. If it works out to live different (female and male) constructions of roles and to turn them into something positive, you gain satisfaction and self-esteem with regard to your own life plan (Schmidtchen 1997: 36pp). The relation between the generations lives from mutuality and care. At the same time family relations get a dangerous potential for subjective failure out of these motives. Latent expectations show emotional burdening and disappointments. Normally, parents want to have satisfied children, they wish that the children find their own way and follow it. But even the supposed mild conflicts of generations in East Germany can not protect the persons involved in a life crisis. Parents feel embittered about their function as advisers if they are refused to be an active member in the labor market and also feel excluded. Life concepts from old people seem useless, out of date. Now the young people become advisers of life. The relation between generation has been reversed. But exactly this "change of roles" needs emotional care and time. Individual efforts can enrich the border of the familiar cohesion or become an "inexorable family egoism" (Böhnisch 2001: 112).

Conclusions

In the GDR youth had been guided by both family and the state. The breakdown of the socialist system forces young people to re-orientate and to re-define their social position. This

includes to resist against processes of de-valuation and find new contexts of meaning. Although many young people experience the uncertainties and biographical ruptures of their parents as painful the majority expresses optimism concerning their future. Young men and women develop a pragmatic attitude between self-discipline on the one hand and the need for emotional support and orientation in family relationships on the other. Life plans of Eastern German youth is structured more tightly compared to the West, also in terms of time perspectives. Steps towards independence are related to the achievement of concrete professional and family related goals which requires enormous biographical investments of both young people and their parents. Especially young women appear to be active and willing to invest in their future. Compared to their parents' generation life concepts are more diversified amongst youth. However, young people from rural and deprived areas struggle in fulfilling these individualized norms.

4.4 Subjective orientations of young migrants and their parents

Life plans of young migrants

Weidacher (2000) carried out a statistical data analysis to compare the living situations of Greek, Italian, Turkish and German young adults. Some of his main results are:

- young migrant women seldom live alone, they prefer traditional concepts as marriage and hardly choose living as non-married couples - this contrasts with the living concepts of young women in eastern and western Germany. Migrant women with children are married to 94 % - compared to 61 % of West German and 36 % of East German women.
- on the contrary, young men (Germans and migrants) live longer at home, stay on their own and prefer living as non-married couples
- the educational background has a high influence on the start of a family until the age of 25 - the share of the 22-25 years old who are already married is mainly limited to those without a final examination or those who visited the Basic Secondary School.
- to start a family as a non-married couple or to deliberately live as a single parent is a German phenomenon.

According to Corneliessen et.al. (2001, 104ff) the family orientation of migrant young people is less clear compared to those of German young people – a closer look shows that especially young (Turkish) men are not interested that much in this life model.

Intergenerational relationships

In the last years family research in migrant families is more and more focussing on questions of social capital and existing networks. In general, these studies show an increased co-orientation of the family members due to the migration process. Family and relatives are of high importance in the networks although the children's generations show that the homogenous ethnic peer group has the same important meaning. In families with a stable social background the relation of the children towards their parents is more and more characterized by parental confidence and not by controlling or pressure. Parents are seen as discussion partners, family as a place of support and negotiation (Herwatz-Emden & Westphal 2000b, 249).

The following reflections derive from two research projects carried out in 1990-1992 and 1996-1997 on parent-children-relations in Greek, Italian, Turkish and Vietnamese families (via standardised surveys and interviews, see Nauck 2000). Some main findings are:

- in all migrant families from a psychological-emotional perspective children are seen as very important to their parents - especially mothers.
- whether children are regarded as a (financial, organisational or emotional) support in the case of illness or age depends on the different welfare systems of the countries of origin on the one hand (e.g especially important for Turkish and Vietnamese families). On the other hand private and familiar support structures and networks are getting more important the less the different migrant groups are included into the host country (due to different reasons) and the option of returning - be it real or just an illusion.
- in which way children are regarded has nothing to do with the respective educational background of the parents but with different normative-cultural values.
- the perception of the cost of children: financial aspects are mostly mentioned by Turkish parents, seldom by Germans. Psychological costs are mentioned in German families by mothers and fathers as well, in Italian, Turkish and Vietnamese families by the mothers, and by Greek fathers.

Expectations of the parents towards their children resulted to be gender specific:

- in all migrant groups daughters are expected to live more in the immediate surrounding and to be available for daily assistance and homework - this is mainly expected by the mothers; only Turkish parents (and here also the fathers) expect their sons to help as well
- expectations concerning financial transfer actions - mostly articulated by the mothers - towards the sons
- especially Turkish families are characterized by (too) high educational expectations of the parents - a fact which the children regard as a kind of stress and pressure. In Greek and Italian families the parents have lower educational expectations than their children.

What do children think that their parents expect from them?

The comparison of the parents' answers with those of their children shows that the latter anticipate and internalise the expectations of the former to a high extent:

- the daughters anticipate the expectation to live near by
- young people from all nationalities regard house work as a girls' job, Turkish young men also formulate their fathers expectations in this regard
- especially young men are expected to support their families/mothers in a financial way (in times of unemployment or age) and to assist younger siblings in educational matters

Conclusions

High emotional ties within migrant families are not weakened by the migration process but strengthened: migration seems to accelerate transformation processes within the families (as the transmission process of normative values shows, see Nauck 2000), but always in generation-convoys. Parental support in different life contexts is as self-evident and necessary as support by peers. The research also shows the "double message" between high parental expectations concerning the options of their children on the one hand (being successful members of this society) and the structural discriminations concerning participation and resources for a self-determined life planning on the other hand that young migrants have to cope with individually. Especially young migrant women are bound into family networks in a way limiting their options (concerning time and mobility resources) – a situation which is solved differently (traditional life concepts vs. active life management).

5. Theoretical Debates and Discourses

Individualisation of youth

Since the early nineties, the core discourse in social sciences – to which most recent discourses refer in a more or less direct way – is the discourse on *individualisation* (Beck 1986). The central issue of this concept is that collective structures and cultural patterns cease in determining individual life courses directly but that individuals increasingly have to negotiate their lives individually. This has often been mis-interpreted in a way that individuals may choose their lives free from structural constraints referring to longitudinal data showing that inequality between life courses has not changed significantly over time (e.g. Hradil 1991; Blossfeld & Mayer 1994). The individualisation argument rather says that social structure – in the sense unequally distributed resources and opportunities – is less embedded in homogenous social contexts but is increasingly reproduced through individual decisions. Therefore individualisation is interrelated with the complementary term of *pluralisation*. Instead of being structured by linear reproduction life courses include complex – yet unequally distributed – interrelations between risk and choice. Beck also argues that individualisation makes individuals more dependant on state (welfare) institutions, i.e. a shift from socialisation through social milieux towards socialisation through labour market and state. At the same time however, individuals are confronted with demands of constructing and constantly re-constructing their lives which has been referred to as *biographisation*: the never-ending question how situations, demands, opportunities relate to oneself (Alheit, 1996; Böhnisch 1997).

With regard to young people's transitions from youth to adult this development has been considered by researchers who analysed young people's life plans as Baethge et al. (1988) or Geissler and Oechsle (1998). With regard to young people's professional orientations – being a main focus of such research – the shift from the concept of professional insertion ('Berufseinmündung') towards the concept of transition ('Übergang') introduced by Brock et al. (1991) in a explicitly holistic perspective. While in the meantime also surveys as the Shell study (e.g. Jugendwerk 1997; 2000) have taken up this perspective, the approach of biographisation has been considered most consequently by the concept 'young adults' applied for the first time by Müller (1990) and developed by authors as Kröhnert (1994) and Walther (1996; 2000). It refers to the fact that the characteristic of life situation ('Lebenslage') of

young adults results from the contradiction between individualised socialisation, ‘subjectivization’ of life plans and at the same time being neglected by the institutions oriented towards the standard biography. Most qualitative research on life plans has been done by feminist researchers focusing young women’s coping with contradictions between culturally acknowledged a self-realization and structurally reduced opportunities resulting in descriptions of young women as “experts of conflict” (Funk 1993; cf. Geissler and Oechsle 1998). A concept which was developed from a socio-pedagogical perspective and which focuses young people’s reaction to this mismatch is that of ‘coping with life’ (‘Lebensbewältigung’) introduced by Böhnisch and Schefold (1985; cf. Böhnisch 1997). In the 1990ies it has been most often been complementary applied with the concept of life-worlds referring to the subjective and collective representations on the basis of which young people act and decide (e.g. Stauber & Walther 1995).

Interestingly, the thematization of the increasing risks that affect young people across most youth research and youth related debates follows rather traditional ways. Vulnerability is mostly related to lack of training opportunities and subsequent risks; whilst deviant behaviour is assumed to emerge from denied aspirations for subjectively relevant positions in the rigid framework of the German training and employment system with a decrease in fully integrated and recognized positions. However, research on violent youth has shown that rather than unemployed youth it is those who have been placed ‘somewhere’ in the regular system – i.e. not corresponding to subjective wishes but implying compromise in both financial and professional terms – who ‘act out’ what they experience as ‘unfair’ competition (Heitmeyer et al. 1992; Held et al. 1998; T. Seifert 1995).

This conventional perspective accounts as well for political claims for additional opportunities and support for young people deriving from such analysis: either an increase in dual system apprenticeship places or an increase in youth assistance, i.e. counselling, youth work and social youth work. There is neither a broader debate about securing individual socio-political citizenship status of young people – including a basic income – nor are informal support systems (peers and family) considered as structuring young people’s lives. The whole context of autonomy versus dependency is under-thematized by German youth research and policy.

Individualization of family

The life course orientation of the individualisation theory has early also affected family research (e.g. Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1990) – also due to a theoretical deficit in family research (cf. Vaskovics 1994). On a very general level, it provided explanations for family changes which subsequently were referred to as the *pluralisation* of life forms:

- single-parent families (Napp-Peters 1985)
- secondary families (Giesecke 1987),
- of patchwork-families (Bernstein 1990)
- continuation families (Ley & Barner 1992)
- separated families (Furstenberg 1993)
- post-familiar families (Beck-Gernsheim 1994).

Homosexual families are hardly ever taken into account in official statistics – although this model of family life is growing in importance and the issue of joint custody for homosexual partnerships with children has gained new attention in the context of a new legislation improving the legal situation of homosexual partnerships (Maihöfer et al. 2001). The picture of a trend indicating a pluralisation of family forms is connected with the popular thesis of the "pluralism of a family's way of life" (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim). Though, more important than the formal change seems to be current modifications and also traditions inside the family (Maihofer et al. 2001:9).

The discourse on individualisation puts the emphasis on the changed *meaning* of families – in whatever form – to the concerned actors as well as to a society in general. It provides a kind of core explanation saying that by social modernisation - and especially in late modernity – normative commitments and traditional bonds (namely the family) decrease, which means that individuals have more freedom but also are forced to choose. While some authors tend to celebrate more this aspect of freedom (also Beck himself), others put more emphasis on new constraints and new demands.

According to Beck-Gernsheim individualisation has most of all affected the internal structures of family life and the dynamic of relationships between family members. Family life increasingly requires the "production of everyday life". Reconciling the single biographies requires more and more organisation. While in former times family life relied on routines now constantly decisions have to be taken and negotiated (Beck-Gernsheim 1994). Geissler and Oechsle (2001) refer to the fact that „accelerated social change is connected to a change of structures and experiences of time" (p. 83). For family life which up to now has been structured by the time structures of (standardized industrial) employment the flexibilisation of the labour society means that family life increasingly has to be re-constructed in everyday life.

„As society renounces to frame needs of children in terms of time and families' typical patterns of time management the erosion of industrial time regimes results in a weakened time structure of family life.“ (p. 87) Seemingly contrary to previous assumptions, family reveals to be a „non-institution of the life course“ (Krüger 2001).

Obviously, the common reference point of "individualisation" does not imply a specific approach applied in family research. Maihofer et al. (2001) distinguish between three main routes starting from this common reference point "individualisation":

- Cultural pessimists, whose diagnosis is the crisis of the family with the result of its disappearing; their vision is an epochal break, with a very negative connotation,
- Modernists, who see in the change of families one aspect of a general change, and
- Utopists, who are looking forward to a fundamental change of one central social institution: the family.

Statistical data (e.g. section) thus can lead to very different interpretations. Sociologists at work: what is taken up as social discourses about families, could be seen as the result of a collective construction, where – among others – social scientists play an important role. Especially topics, which are closely related to questions about gender divisions of work or, more generally, "social responsibility" (e.g. between the generations), very easily tend to become a matter of ideology. As well the discourse on individualisation is an example for such ideology as long as it "exaggerates" the individualized situation by neglecting social bonds, care and other reproductive work. A critical feminist debate about individualisation within gender relationships (Diezinger 1991) make clear that this kind of work has to be done, otherwise a society would not exist any more, and that it is been done – until now mainly by women. The covered part of individualisation again tells a lot about families – they might be individualized, but they also represent a modernized gender hierarchy in the division of work. Almost all studies dealing with the above mentioned variety of forms of living first have to deconstruct normalized and normalizing understandings of "the family". Basis for this deconstruction very often is the body of critical historical family research carried out by feminist studies in the seventies and eighties, which corrected the idealised picture of the family and contextualized it as an invention of the bourgeois epoque.

Important turning points in such research on "different families" also have been made by feminist research, e.g. in studies about single mothers the turn from a deficit oriented perspective to a perspective on chances, self-determination and agency (Heiliger 1991). This change of perspective can also be seen in research focussing on ethnic differences: whereas

for a long time migrant families mainly were focused as just pre-modern and backward, nowadays the research concentrates on their diverse dynamics, ambiguities and potentials (Herwatz-Emden & Westphal 2000).

Although pluralisation now has much more normality, until today there are two different basic understandings/debates in family research: to take these changes seriously (and see them also against a structural background) or to pretend the existence of *the* family (saying for example, that until today the small legalized family is the main form of living) by neglecting that also traditional forms might have changed their meaning. The latter until the nineties according to Beck was the main understanding about family: as he put in an ironical remark in his opening speech of the 25th German Sociological Conference: "As example: research on the core family: there are shocking tendencies: "wild marriages", marriages without certificate, increasing single-households, single parents, lonesome parents wandering around. But with some important exceptions, family sociology, especially in Germany, since years is concerned to sign "all-clear". In the core of the core family all is as 'fit as a fiddle' (kerngesund)." (Beck 1991:43).

In the second route – which obviously got more ground in the last decade - family is seen as a dynamic process, where events as the beginning or ending of partnerships are constitutive (Vaskovics 1994:13). This route turns the focus on intergenerational relationships and their dynamics – independently from being relatives or not. It also raises awareness for the importance of inter-generational relationships not only between parents and children, but also towards the generation of grandparents; and it opens up the range of intergenerational relationships to adults/ young people outside the family. Lüscher and colleagues (Lüscher 1993) are dealing with intergenerational relationships – inside and outside families. They see them highly adequate to cope with post-modern demands, but they explicitly involve *different* kinds of these relationships. Their core topic and their heuristic starting point are ambivalences within these relationships: Intergenerational relations imply and generate ambivalences (see one of our starting points: semi-dependence in yoyo-ized transitions).

Theories focusing only on aspects of family solidarity are too one dimensional to come to terms with the complexity of emotional, normative and moral expectations – of both sides (parents as well as their children). Lüscher et al. (1993) show how many research questionnaires are reproducing this reduction by e.g. posing questions concerning intergenerational relations only in an exclusionary way (either a or b) and not in an including manner (as well as). Especially with regard to all status passages such family ambiguities can

be seen in an explicit way: research mostly concentrates on changing relation patterns in case of parental illness or care (expectations of reciprocity of assistance) but they suggest to transfer this concept also to other key situations.

Family and welfare

Some authors (e.g. Böhnisch & Lenz 1997) critically analyse a state of anomie (Merton 1998), where individuals' choice – whether actively being sought for or structurally imposed – are not allowed for by the means and spaces necessary for 'real' choice; here, as well as in the work of Kaufmann et al. (1997) family research is related to a critical debate about the welfare state, which could be regarded as a set of individualizing structures in so far as German welfare policies reduce collective responsibility for social risks thus individualizing them (see below). Family in this perspective continues to be seen as a 'natural resource' the integrative potential of which can be taken for granted. According to recent social surveys, family – especially in East Germany – is seen as a refuge and "coral" (Jugendwerk 2000:211) in an increasingly alienated society. However, this description of family as a sheet anchor does not meet the family situation of families in East Germany. Families more or less overtly are given the responsibility for success or failure of (young people's) biographies by which most of them are overburdened. The burden of failure is doubled by the burden of self-responsibility. According to Sturzbecher such contradictions can be found in the relationships between young people and families as well. Whilst family values are replaced by individualised life plans the need of family support increases (Sturzbecher 2001).

This analysis is undermined by comparative welfare studies revealing that the German – conservative, corporatist and employment-centred – welfare state neither refers to individuals in a (universal) way in which they (especially children, young people, women and the elderly) become independent from family support nor to families as relation-based networks of everyday life. On the one hand, German welfare continues to rely on individual labour market performance in the sense of regular – dependent and full-time – employment and thus to imply the standard biography whilst the securing of individual transitions is left to the residual system of social assistance. On the other hand, families are addressed by social insurance and tax system as reproductive units in a way that rewards women renouncing on individual careers while infrastructures relating to the organisation of family life lack in broad scale (Esping-Andersen 1990; Beck-Gernsheim 1994; Ostner 1995; 2000; Gallie & Paugam 2000).

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Nr. 1-2006	Lebenslanges Lernen - ein Konzept zum Abbau der Benachteiligung von Jugendlichen?	Axel Pohl	Dezember 2006
Nr. 1-2005	Thematic Study on Policy Measures concerning Disadvantaged Youth. Final report	Andreas Walther & Axel Pohl	Dezember 2005
Nr. 1-2004	Trust, space, time and opportunities Case study report on participation and non-formal education in the support for young people in transitions to work in West-Germany	Axel Pohl & Barbara Stauber	Februar 2004
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Nr. 2-2000	Beratung sozialer Netzwerke im Dritten Sektor: Beschäftigung für (benachteiligte) Jugendliche in der Jugend- und Sozialarbeit. Abschlussbericht	Anne Schwarz, Barbara Stauber & Andreas Walther	Dezember 2000

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Nr. 1-2000	„Coming out of the shell“ - Advantages of performing arts in the context of riskful youth transitions. Report on the research project „Secondary learning effects in community arts“	Rui B. Banha, Maria do Carmo Gomes, Steven Miles, Axel Pohl, Barbara Stauber & Andreas Walther	März 2000
Nr. 1-1999	Institutionelle Risiken sozialer Ausgrenzung im deutschen Übergangssystem. Nationaler Bericht für Deutschland (West)	Barbara Stauber & Andreas Walther	März 2000

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